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Deborah L. Brake
Abstract
This Article takes a comprehensive look at retaliation and its place in discrimi-
nation law. The Article begins by examining current social science literature to
understand how retaliation operates as a social practice to silence challenges to
discrimination and preserve inequality.
Then, using the recent controversy over whether to imply a private right of ac-
tion for retaliation from a general ban on discrimination as a launching point, the
Article theorizes the connections between retaliation and discrimination as legal
constructs, and contends that retaliation should be viewed as a species of inten-
tional discrimination. The Article argues that situating retaliation as a practice
that is implicitly encompassed by a ban on discrimination pushes discrimination
law in promising directions.
Recognizing retaliation as a form of discrimination challenges the dominant anti-
differentiation model of discrimination and promotes a broader conception of dis-
crimination as the preservation of race and gender privilege. In addition, recogniz-
ing protection from retaliation as implicit in legal proscriptions on discrimination
furthers the democratic underpinnings of discrimination law by adding content to
the ideal of equal citizenship.
Finally, the Article contends that an existing doctrinal constraint on the retaliation
claim, the reasonable belief requirement, undermines the potentially progressive
role that the retaliation claim can play in realizing its promise for discrimination
law. The Article urges a reconsideration of this doctrine to bring the retaliation
claim closer to the theory advanced here.
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ABSTRACT: This Article takes a comprehensive look at retaliation and its place in 
discrimination law.  The Article begins by examining current social science literature to 
understand how retaliation operates as a social practice to silence challenges to 
discrimination and preserve inequality.  Then, using the recent controversy over whether 
to imply a private right of action for retaliation from a general ban on discrimination as a 
launching point, the Article theorizes the connections between retaliation and 
discrimination as legal constructs, and contends that retaliation should be viewed as a 
species of intentional discrimination.  The Article argues that situating retaliation as a 
practice that is implicitly encompassed by a ban on discrimination pushes discrimination 
law in promising directions.  Recognizing retaliation as a form of discrimination 
challenges the dominant anti-differentiation model of discrimination and promotes a 
broader conception of discrimination as the preservation of race and gender privilege.  In 
addition, recognizing protection from retaliation as implicit in legal proscriptions on 
discrimination furthers the democratic underpinnings of discrimination law by adding 
content to the ideal of equal citizenship.  Finally, the Article contends that an existing 
doctrinal constraint on the retaliation claim, the reasonable belief requirement, 
undermines the potentially progressive role that the retaliation claim can play in realizing 
its promise for discrimination law.  The Article urges a reconsideration of this doctrine to 
bring the retaliation claim closer to the theory advanced here.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
In the wealth of scholarship about discrimination and inequality, retaliation is an 
under-studied phenomenon.  The vast majority of legal scholars who write about 
discrimination focus their energies on the important work of enriching prevailing 
understandings of bias and how law regulates it.  Legal scholarship has not paid sufficient 
attention to the ways people are punished for challenging inequality and the law’s 
response to these challenges.  Retaliation, in particular, is typically regarded as an 
afterthought, a relatively small part of a larger scheme for enforcing substantive legal 
protections.  This Article develops a broader theory of retaliation and its place in the 
antidiscrimination project.  By shining a spotlight on retaliation and its relationship to 
discrimination law, I seek to develop a better understanding of both retaliation and 
discrimination and the legal principles that govern them.
Retaliation is an important social phenomenon, deserving of study for several 
reasons.  First, it is prevalent.  Although it is impossible to know how often retaliation 
follows challenges to discrimination within institutions, the evidence suggests it is far 
from uncommon.  Retaliation claims make up a significant portion of the claims asserted 
in discrimination cases.1  Social dynamics within institutions make retaliation a likely 
response to charges of discrimination.  Recent social science research shows that women 
and persons of color are perceived negatively and are disliked by majority group 
members when they step forward to challenge discrimination.2  By challenging 
discrimination and unjust social privilege, they are perceived as transgressing the social 
order, creating prime conditions for retaliation.  Because retaliation can occur in any 
institution and in response to any type of discrimination challenge, the problem of 
retaliation cuts across discrimination law broadly and is not limited to any one legal 
context.
Second, retaliation is powerful medicine, functioning to suppress discrimination 
claims and preserve the social order.  Fear of retaliation is the leading reason why people 
stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination.  When 
1 See, e.g., National Partnership for Women & Families, Women at Work:  Looking Behind the Numbers, at 
12 (July 2004) (available at http://app.nationalpartnership.org/docs/CRA%2040th% 20Ann%20Report.pd) 
(analyzing data on workplace discrimination claims and observing that in FY2003, retaliation charges 
comprised 27.9% of the total charges filed with the EEOC); Sex Discrimination Cases Predominate in 
Recent Class Actions Filed by EEOC, 71 U.S.L.W. 2158 (Sept. 10, 2002) (reporting that, of the 52 class 
action cases filed by the EEOC between October 1, 2001, and June 30, 2002, 25 of the cases included 
claims of retaliation); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law (forthcoming 
2005, and on file with author) (describing their empirical study of racial harassment cases and noting that 
nearly half of the racial harassment cases in a random sample of all racial harassment cases through 2002 
included claims for retaliation); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race and National Origin Employment 
Discrimination Litigation in Federal District Courts, Wake Forest University Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 05-09, Feb. 2005, at 19 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=678082) (finding, 
in her empirical study of race and national origin discrimination litigation in district courts, that the most 
common type of claim was for retaliation, at 51%).
2 See Part II.B., infra.
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3challengers are brave enough to overcome their fears of speaking out, retaliation often 
steps in to punish the challenger and restore the social norms in question.  Retaliation 
thus works to silence discrimination claimants and preserve the social order.3  To a large 
extent, the effectiveness and very legitimacy of discrimination law turns on people’s 
ability to raise concerns about discrimination without fear of retaliation.  The recent trend 
towards legally enforced privatization in the assertion and resolution of discrimination 
complaints gives added importance to the law’s treatment of retaliation.  As legal 
doctrine increasingly channels discrimination complaints through internal institutional 
processes, the need for strong legal protection from retaliation becomes all the more 
urgent.4
Third and finally, the extent of protection from retaliation found in discrimination 
law tells us a great deal about the scope of discrimination law and the values it protects.  
The nature of the relationship between discrimination and retaliation was the subject of a 
recent case in the United States Supreme Court, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of 
Education.5  This case required the Court to decide whether a broad proscription against 
sex discrimination, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,6 necessarily includes 
protection from retaliation for challenging discrimination under the statute.  The contours 
of this relationship are as important for what they reveal about the scope of 
discrimination law as the treatment of retaliation in particular.  This Article contends that 
a careful study of retaliation and its relationship to discrimination raises pressing 
questions about the scope of the antidiscrimination principle and its animating values.
Recognizing retaliation as a form of discrimination, one that is implicitly banned 
by general proscriptions of discrimination, pushes the boundaries of dominant 
understandings of discrimination in useful and productive ways.  Theorizing retaliation as 
a form of discrimination requires moving beyond discrimination law’s current dominant 
framework of status-based differential treatment and toward a broader conception that 
views discrimination as the maintenance of race and gender privilege.  Retaliation, 
functioning as it does to maintain social hierarchies and punish outliers, fits well within 
such a framework.  Conceptualizing retaliation as proposed in this Article offers a 
number of advantages for discrimination law.  By shifting the focus from the status-based 
treatment of individuals to larger questions of illegitimate privilege and the importance of 
contesting inequality, the retaliation claim permits a more fluid conception of social 
identity than that offered by the traditional anti-differentiation model.  The retaliation 
claimant need not establish that she was treated worse “as a woman,” but rather that she 
was penalized for challenging sexist practices, thus avoiding the problem with traditional 
discrimination claims of unintentionally reinforcing an essentialist view of what it means 
3
  The social dynamics of retaliation are discussed at length, infra, Part III.C.
4 See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:  A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 458 (2001) (describing legal doctrines and trends promoting the privatization of information-
gathering and dispute-resolution for claims of bias and discrimination in the workplace).  Legal doctrine 
has begun to encourage a similar trend in schools, by requiring certain claimants to provide prior notice 
through school grievance procedures before gaining legal protection from discrimination.  See Gebser v. 
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (requiring prior notice to school officials followed by 
deliberate indifference to establish school liability for teacher-student sexual harassment); Davis v. Monroe 
County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (adopting same standard for sexual harassment by students).
5
  No. 02-1672, petition for cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (2004).
6
  20 U.S.C. § 1681.
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4to be “a woman” through the assertion of a sex equality right.  In addition, by valuing and 
protecting the claimant’s choices and actions in challenging inequality, the retaliation 
claim is less vulnerable than other types of discrimination claims to criticisms that it turns 
claimants into passive victims of an oppressive social structure.  Finally, the retaliation 
claim shifts the focus from an individual’s prejudicial intent to his or her actions in 
shutting down opposition to inequality.  In each of these respects, the retaliation claim 
offers important insights about how discrimination law can best disrupt social and 
institutional inequality.
In addition to these benefits, theorizing retaliation as a form of discrimination 
adds an important dimension to current understandings of the democratic underpinnings 
of discrimination law.  Recognizing protection from retaliation as implicit in a legal ban 
on discrimination furthers the democratic values at the foundation of the law’s 
nondiscrimination guarantee.  Discrimination law is often understood as promoting the 
ideal of equal citizenship as necessary to a fully functioning democracy.  However, the 
components of equal citizenship and the social practices that promote equal citizenship 
are rarely examined.  Studying the retaliation claim generates new insights into these 
questions.  By protecting practices that challenge racism and sexism, the retaliation claim 
promotes the elimination of illegitimate racist and sexist preferences that taint democratic 
outcomes.  In addition, by protecting challengers of discrimination regardless of their 
social group membership, the retaliation claim enables coalition-building and collective 
opposition to racism and sexism that often cuts across social groups.  In the process, it 
protects the construction of equal citizens who work together in the pursuit of social 
change and the social bonds that develop through such alliances.
However, in the final analysis, the retaliation claim is only as promising as its 
defining doctrines allow.  The retaliation claim’s potential to push discrimination law in 
progressive directions depends on the calibration of legal rules that set its limits.  One of 
the most restrictive and damaging doctrinal limits that has emerged in recent years is the 
requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a reasonable belief that the underlying conduct 
at the source of her complaint amounts to unlawful discrimination.  This doctrine has 
received little scholarly attention, not commensurate with its importance.  As applied by 
courts, the reasonable belief doctrine severely undercuts the law’s protection of persons 
who challenge inequality.  This Article advocates revisiting this doctrinal limit in order to 
realize the full potential of the retaliation claim.
Finally, a note is in order about the focus of this Article.  This discussion of 
retaliation focuses primarily on challenges to race and gender inequality.  Challenges to 
inequality and discrimination on any grounds risk triggering retaliation, and much of the 
analysis of this Article applies to institutional and legal responses to discrimination 
claims more generally.  While I acknowledge that emphasizing only two aspects of 
identity and bias risks oversimplifying both the complexity of subjects and the 
complexity of bias,7 I have chosen to focus primarily on challenges to race and gender 
inequality for two reasons.  First, legal protections from retaliation are tied to 
nondiscrimination guarantees that single out race and gender, along with other protected 
class statuses, as protected identities and treat them as single-axis forms of bias.  
7 See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:  A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
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5Although race and gender bias are complex in their similarities and differences, the legal 
standards for retaliation treat challenges to race and gender bias the same.  The analysis 
here draws substantially on case law addressing protection from retaliation for 
challenging race and gender discrimination.  Second, the social science literature 
surveyed for this Article focuses primarily on race and gender bias, and reveals a similar 
dynamic with respect to retaliation as punishment for challenging race and gender 
inequality.  I do not intend to suggest that race and gender are fungible, but rather that 
there are important commonalities in how retaliation punishes “outsiders” who challenge 
systemic privilege, and it is useful to examine race and gender bias as interlocking 
systems of subordination.8  Finally, the focus on race and gender in this discussion should 
not be read to imply that retaliation for challenging other kinds of inequality, such as 
sexual orientation discrimination, does not raise similar concerns.  Indeed, the 
commonalities with respect to race and gender bias claimants, and the role of social 
power in the dynamics of retaliation, suggest reason to believe that the analysis offered 
here applies to challenges to other forms of bias as well.
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II examines social science literature for 
what it tells us about retaliation in response to complaints about discrimination.  This 
section examines a number of questions, including why retaliation happens and the work 
that it performs within institutions.  This literature paints a picture of retaliation as a 
social dynamic that punishes transgressions against the social order and silences 
challengers.  The understanding of retaliation that emerges from this literature sets the 
stage for an exploration of the legal and theoretical questions about the proper treatment 
of retaliation under discrimination law.
Part III turns to legal understandings of retaliation and its relationship to 
nondiscrimination guarantees.  This section examines the recent controversy over 
implying a private right of action against retaliation in a nondiscrimination statute that is 
silent about retaliation claims.  After explaining this doctrinal controversy and its 
culmination in the Jackson case, this section contends that the issue of whether to 
recognize such an implied private right of action is a tougher question than is commonly 
assumed.  The current dominant interpretation limits discrimination to the status-based 
differential treatment of individuals.  Recognizing retaliation as a form of intentional 
discrimination, as the Court did in Jackson, requires pushing the scope of discrimination 
law beyond the current dominant understanding.  The remainder of this section offers a 
theoretical approach that reconciles discrimination law with implicit protection from 
retaliation by conceptualizing discrimination as encompassing systemic race and gender 
privilege and the punishment of persons who contest it.  Finally, this section elaborates 
the many advantages such an understanding holds for discrimination law, including the 
furtherance of the law’s democracy-enhancing values.
Part IV turns from the promise of the retaliation claim to the reality of restrictive 
doctrinal limits that currently undermine this potential.  This section discusses the 
reasonable belief doctrine in retaliation claims and criticizes its current application in the 
courts.  In the final analysis, the reasonable belief doctrine requires reconsideration in 
8 Cf. Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between 
Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251 (2002) (analyzing the interlocking and symbiotic nature of 
systems of subordination and advocating strategies for change that emphasize the overlaps and connections 
between social groups).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
6order to avoid turning the retaliation claim into a vehicle that legitimates privilege and 
inequality instead of undermining them.  The Article concludes that, like much 
discrimination law, the retaliation claim, as currently constructed, simultaneously 
tantalizes and then retreats in its promise to disrupt entrenched systems of privilege and 
inequality.
II.  THE NEED TO PROTECT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMANTS:
LESSONS FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE
The social science literature on bias and the dynamics of challenging 
discrimination shows retaliation to be a powerful weapon of punishment for persons who 
challenge the hierarchies of race and gender.  The research discussed in this section 
reveals three main points.  First, retaliation operates against a backdrop of widespread 
reluctance to acknowledge and report discrimination.  This reluctance reflects an acute 
understanding of the social costs of identifying and challenging discrimination.  Second, 
persons who challenge discrimination are often disliked by the beneficiaries of the social 
structure.  This dislike creates prime conditions for retaliation.  Third, the threat of 
retaliation functions as a powerful silencer.  It suppresses challenges to race and gender 
bias, thereby functioning to preserve the social order.  The understanding of retaliation 
that emerges from this literature demonstrates the need for strong legal protection from 
retaliation against persons who identify and challenge inequality.
A.  THE BACKGROUND: THE RELUCTANCE TO ACKNOWLEDGE AND 
REPORT DISCRIMINATION
As anyone who has experienced bias or prejudice knows, naming and challenging 
discrimination is socially and psychologically difficult.  By the time retaliation intervenes 
to punish someone for alleging discrimination, that person has already overcome a 
myriad of psychological and social forces operating to suppress that claim.  Research in 
social psychology has documented a marked reluctance among the targets of 
discrimination to label and confront their experiences as such.  It is worth discussing this 
phenomenon at the outset, as it is an important piece of the social fabric suppressing 
claims of bias, and provides the background against which retaliation performs its work.
Persons subjected to unfairness have a widely shared reluctance to see themselves 
as victims.9  This general disinclination becomes particularly salient in the context of 
acknowledging one’s own experiences with discrimination.  Persons who acknowledge 
that discrimination disadvantages their social group as a whole nonetheless tend to see 
9
  The research discussed here specifically focuses on the reluctance of individuals to acknowledge race 
and/or gender bias, but it is consistent with other general psychological phenomena, including the tendency 
to underestimate the occurrence of negative events, the illusion of unique invulnerability, and the better 
than average effect.  See, e.g., Karen M. Ruggiero & Donald M. Taylor, Why Minority Group Members 
Perceive or Do Not Perceive the Discrimination that Confronts Them: The Role of Self-Esteem and 
Perceived Control, 72(2) J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 373 (1997).
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7themselves as the lucky exceptions, even when confronted with reason to believe they 
have experienced discrimination.10
Recent studies in this area have continued to show a general reluctance on the part 
of women and persons of color to perceive themselves as targets of discrimination, 
notwithstanding evidence that discrimination has occurred.  One recent series of studies 
using women to test perceptions of sex bias and African-Americans and Asian-
Americans to test perceptions of race bias found a shared tendency to resist 
interpretations of discrimination in situations where it was ambiguous, but likely to have 
occurred.11  Employing a model often used in this literature, the subjects were given a 
series of written aptitude tests and then presented with poor test results, along with 
information suggesting some chance, in varying degrees of likelihood, that their test had 
been evaluated by a grader who was biased against their social group.12  The subjects 
then answered questions about their test-taking experience, including questions designed 
to elicit their perceptions of why they performed poorly on the test.  The researchers 
found that the subjects consistently blamed the poor test results on themselves rather than 
on discrimination, except for those who had learned with certainty that their judge had 
been biased.13  Interestingly, the rate of self-blaming, as opposed to discrimination-
claiming, was nearly identical when there was any ambiguity about discrimination by the 
graders, regardless of whether the information suggested a high or low likelihood of such 
discrimination.14
In examining the reasons for this phenomenon, researchers found that the subjects 
who attributed their poor test results to personal failings were able to preserve their self-
esteem as a social actor, albeit at the expense of their self-esteem in the performance 
domain.15  Avoiding attributions of discrimination enabled the subjects to preserve their 
socially oriented self-esteem and their feelings of control over their destiny.16
10 See, e.g., Elizabeth H. Dodd et al., Respected or Rejected:  Perceptions of Women Who Confront Sexist 
Remarks, 45(7/8) SEX ROLES 567, 568-69 (2001) (summarizing research showing that women tend to 
explain away sexism and discrimination, despite evidence that it has occurred); Faye J. Crosby, Why 
Complain?, 49(1) J. SOC. ISSUES 169, 174 (1993).
11
  See Ruggiero & Taylor, supra note 9. 
12 Id.  The subjects in both groups were undergraduate students who were recruited to participate in the 
study from an introductory psychology course.  The study was closely modeled on an earlier study using 
women as subjects, where women were told, after receiving negative test results, that 100%, 75%, 50%, 
25% or 0% of the judges discriminated against women.  In all but the 100% group, the women consistently 
blamed themselves rather than discrimination for the poor results. Perhaps most strikingly, they were 
equally likely to blame themselves given a 75% likelihood of discrimination as they were when given a 
25% likelihood.  Id. (explaining earlier research).  This follow-up study sought to replicate these results
using two subject groups, one examining gender and the other examining race, and sought to probe more 
deeply the reasons for the reluctance to blame discrimination.  Id. at 374, 376.
13
  In the experiment with Asian American and African American subjects, the researchers found that the 
Asian American subjects exhibited a slightly greater tendency to blame the test results on personal failings.  
Id.  Interestingly, white and male subjects in the control groups did not minimize perceived discrimination, 
but were highly vigilant in perceiving discrimination against themselves, suggesting the importance of 
social group membership in explaining the reluctance to make attributions to discrimination.  Id. at 382, 
386.
14 See id. at 374, 385.
15 Id. at 375.
16 Id. at 376. The efforts of the subjects to manage their identity, and its attendant costs, remind me of Pat 
Williams’ work discussing her own efforts to construct something positive from that part of her that is 
shaped by racial oppression.  She discussed her conflicting feelings about her mother’s statement when she 
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8These findings support prior research documenting the threat that acknowledging 
discrimination poses to an individual’s sense of control and invulnerability.17  The widely 
shared “just world” hypothesis, which posits a common desire to believe that the world is 
a just place, encourages such cognitive distortions to enable people to attribute negative 
outcomes to factors within their individual control.18  Since perceiving and 
acknowledging discrimination is a prerequisite for engaging in any form of considered 
resistance to it, one unfortunate implication of these findings is that members of 
stigmatized social groups are less inclined to challenge systemic discrimination, thereby 
silently facilitating it.19
For those targets of discrimination who overcome their own psychological 
resistance to perceiving themselves as victims of discrimination, additional obstacles 
suppress publicly confronting and reporting it.  Social psychologists have noted a striking 
gap between recognizing an experience as discrimination and publicly naming it as 
such.20  Most of the research on the low level of reporting discrimination has been done 
in the area of sexual harassment.  Social science literature on sexual harassment abounds 
with findings showing that sexually harassed women most often choose coping strategies 
of avoidance or denial and that the least likely response is to report the harassment to 
got in to Harvard law school, that she “had it in her blood” because the slave owner who raped her great-
grandmother was a lawyer.  Among Williams’ mixed emotions was a feeling of pride of ownership of her 
abilities.  See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR
216 (1991).
17
  Crosby, supra note 10, at 174.
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., Cheryl Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, A Stress and Coping Perspective on Confronting Sexism, 28 
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 168, 175 (2004) (“[A]cknowledging prejudice and discrimination is an essential 
precursor to efforts aimed at mitigating the injustices that might otherwise continue to exist. . . [W]hen 
groups of disenfranchised individuals come together with a common goal, such as reducing sexism, this can 
result in social movements that bring about changes that actually affect how the group is treated.”) 
[hereinafter Kaiser & Miller, A Stress and Coping Perspective].
20 Id. at 168; Charles Stangor et al., Reporting Discrimination in Public and Private Contexts, 82(1) J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 69, 69 (2002) (“[P]rior research has shown that members of stigmatized 
groups are in many cases unlikely to report that negative events that occur to them are due to 
discrimination, even when this is a valid attribution for the event.”).
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9someone in a position of authority.21  The low-likelihood of reporting sexual harassment 
cuts across differences in racial, cultural and professional backgrounds.22
The robustness of social science findings on the reluctance of women to publicly 
confront sexist behavior is all the more significant in that it defies expectations about how 
women believe they would behave if confronted with discrimination.  In one important 
study of women’s responses to sexism, the vast majority of the women subjects predicted 
that they would challenge certain sexist remarks when asked how they would respond to 
a specific scenario involving blatantly sexist comments.23  However, in another part of 
the same study, a majority of female subjects did not in fact challenge the same sexist 
remarks when actually faced with such a scenario.24  The women’s silence in the face of 
21 See, e.g., Mindy E. Bergman et al., The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and 
Consequences of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87(2) J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 230 (2002); Shereen G. 
Bingham & Lisa L. Sherer, Factors Associated with Responses to Sexual Harassment and Satisfaction with 
Outcome, 29 SEX ROLES 239, 240, 247-48 (1993); Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women 
and Changed Organizations: Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL 
BEHAV. 28, 37-39 (1993); Deborah Erdos Knapp et al., Determinants of Target Responses to Sexual 
Harassment:  A Conceptual Framework, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 687, 689-92 (1997); Louise F. Fitzgerald 
& Suzanne Swan, Why Didn’t She Just Report Him?  The Psychological and Legal Implications of 
Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUE 117, 121-22 (1995); Laurie A. Rudman et al., 
Suffering in Silence:  Procedural Justice Versus Gender Socialization in University Sexual Harassment 
Grievance Procedures, 9(4) BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 519 (1995); see also David Sherwyn, 
Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800” Harassment 
Hotline:  An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual 
Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1281 (2001) (reporting results of a study finding that 
among women who ultimately sued their employers for sexual harassment, nearly half, 42%, did not report 
the harassment prior to suing and only 15% did so in a timely manner).
22 See, e.g., S. Arzu Wasti & Lilia M. Cortina, Coping in Context: Sociocultural Determinants of 
Response to Sexual Harassment, 83(2) J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 394-405 (2002) (reporting results 
of study comparing responses to sexual harassment by professional women in Turkey, professional and 
working class Anglo-American women in the United States, and professional and working class Hispanic 
women in the United States, and finding that women from all of these backgrounds resorted to “advocacy-
seeking,” such as reporting, complaining or speaking with management, the least frequently in responding 
to sexual harassment); Knapp et al., supra note 21, at 687, 693 -94 (citing research showing no relationship 
between women’s race and their responses to sexual harassment).  Even women attorneys, a group one 
might expect to be especially confident in asserting their rights, exhibit a reluctance to publicly claim bias.  
See Lilia Cortina et al., What’s Gender Got to do with it?  Incivility in the Federal Courts, 27 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 235 (2002) (describing study of female attorney’s responses to incivility in legal practice, a 
phenomenon with a gender-based dimension); Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Stop Complaining!  The 
Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimination, 27(2) PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 
255 (2001) (describing study of female attorneys’ responses to sex discrimination in the workplace).
23
  Janet K. Swim & Lauri L. Hyers, Excuse Me—What Did You Just Say?!”  Women’s Public and Private 
Responses to Sexist Remarks, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68-88 (1999).  The scenario involved a 
conversation in which a male colleague made three remarks with overtly sexist overtones:  (1) openly 
endorsing traditional gender roles; (2) seeing women as sex objects; and (3) expressing the view that 
women are responsible for domestic chores.  The researchers counted a subject’s response as a 
confrontation if she confronted one or more of these three comments.
24 Id. Although very few women predicted that they would not respond to the sexist comments, in fact, 
only 45% confronted the remarks in some way, most frequently using indirect strategies such as asking the 
commentator to repeat himself or asking a rhetorical question.  Only 16% of the women directly challenged 
any of the remarks, despite the fact that the women in the first part of the study had overwhelmingly 
predicted that they would directly challenge the sexist remarks.  Id. Among the variables correlated with a 
confrontation response, one of the highest was a predisposition to a feminist and activist orientation.  The 
researchers concluded that it takes a person particularly committed to resisting sexism to overcome the 
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sexist behaviors reflected the influence of social constraints and the fear of negative 
judgments if they confronted the offender, rather than an acceptance of, or acquiescence 
in, the situation.25
This striking gap between expected and actual responses to bias was confirmed in 
a subsequent study designed to more closely replicate an employment setting.26  In this 
study, college-age women were asked to predict how they would respond to three sexist 
questions in a job interview.  A different group of subjects, also college-age women, were 
then placed in a simulated job interview, allegedly to qualify for a research assistant 
position, and were asked the same three sexist questions.27  Again, women’s actual 
responses were dramatically less confrontational than predicted, with very few women 
confronting the questioner in any way.28  Once again, the tepid responses reflected an 
acute awareness of the social costs of confronting discrimination, rather than an 
acceptance of the situation.29
social influences constraining confrontation.  Id. at 85.  Interestingly, the women were somewhat less likely 
to confront the remarks when there was another woman present in the group when the incident occurred, as 
opposed to when they were the only woman in the group.  Id. at 79-80.  Apparently, the presence of another 
woman who was silent reinforced the subject’s own inclination to remain silent, while the absence of 
another woman placed the sole moral responsibility on the subject to confront the sexist comments.
25 Id. at 79 (reporting that, among the women who did not engage in confrontation, three-quarters judged 
the commentator as prejudiced and ninety-one percent held negative views toward him); see also Dodd et 
al., supra note 10, at 567, 569 (discussing women’s fears of how others would perceive them if they 
confronted sexism).
26
  See Julie Woodzicka & Marianne LaFrance, Real Versus Imagined Gender Harassment, 57(1) J. SOC. 
ISSUES 15 (2001).  In the first part of the study, 197 college-age female respondents read a written scenario 
describing the job interview and were asked how they would respond if this happened to them.  This group 
of subjects read a written account of the interview and then discussed how they would respond if they 
found themselves in such a situation.  The study was designed to further test and explore findings from 
prior research, including the Swim and Hyers study discussed above, showing a large gap between 
women’s expectations that they would confront or report sexism compared to their actual non-
confrontational responses.
27
  The offending questions were asked by a male interviewer and were interspersed with more normal 
interview questions.  The three questions were:  (1) do you have a boyfriend?  (2) do people find you 
desirable?  And (3) do you think it is important for women to wear bras in the workplace?  Each of these 
questions was pretested, using a different set of subjects, to confirm that it was perceived by women to be 
sexually harassing.  Id.
28 Id. at 23-24.  A strong majority, 68%, had predicted they would refuse to answer at least one of the 
questions, with 62% saying they would ask the interviewer why he had asked the question or tell him the 
question was inappropriate and 28% saying they would take more drastic measures such as abruptly leaving 
the room or rudely confronting the interviewer.  Id. at 21.  Of the women actually on the receiving end of 
the questions, over half ignored the sexist nature of the questions altogether, responding literally to the 
question asked, and slightly over one-third politely asked the interviewer why he asked the question, but 
then proceeded to answer it anyway.  Id. at 23-24.  Of the subjects who asked why the interviewer had 
asked the question, 80% did so after the interview was over, while at the moment the question was asked, 
they simply responded.  None of the women refused to answer any of the questions, directly challenged the 
interviewer, left the interview, or reported the interviewer to an authority figure.  Id.
29 Most of the women in the first part of the study predicted that they would feel angry if they were asked 
such questions, but among the women actually in the interview setting, the predominant emotional response 
was fear:  40% of the women reported feeling fear and only 16% reported feeling angry at the time.  Id. at 
25-26.  Fear was more salient than anger in predicting the subject’s response.  Id.; cf. id. at 18 (explaining 
that even in the controlled environment of a job interview, “targets of sexual harassment fear retaliation, 
reprisals, and possibly even physical harm” and citing literature interpreting sexual harassment as a 
manifestation of intimidation rather than sexuality).  Interestingly, the researchers who observed the 
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This research reveals a world in which even seemingly passive targets of 
discrimination respond as active agents who make choices about when to confront, 
challenge, or ignore prejudice.  Most significantly for our purposes, the research 
demonstrates that the widespread failure to publicly confront discrimination, contrary to 
expectations, is largely shaped by an acute perception of the social costs of doing so.30
The next section addresses these social costs, and the conditions that give rise to them.
B.  WHY RETALIATE? PERSONS WHO CLAIM DISCRIMINATION ARE 
DISLIKED FOR TRANSGRESSING THE SOCIAL ORDER
A disturbing body of research demonstrates a high propensity for men and white 
persons to dislike women and people of color when they claim discrimination, even when 
the claim is meritorious.  The social penalty for transgressing social roles and challenging 
perceived inequality sets the stage for retaliation.
Social psychologists have found that women and racial minorities are perceived 
as troublemakers and hypersensitive when they confront discrimination.31  One of the 
path-breaking studies of its kind, conducted in 2001 by social psychologists Cheryl 
Kaiser and Carol Miller, found that African Americans who blamed discrimination for a 
poor performance rating on a test were viewed more negatively than African Americans 
who blamed themselves.32  The predominantly white evaluators consistently rated an 
African American student more negatively--as a complainer, a troublemaker, 
hypersensitive, emotional, argumentative, and irritating--when he attributed his poor test 
performance to discrimination rather than to his own ability, regardless of the objective 
likelihood that the student actually experienced discrimination.33  A follow-up 
experiment by the same researchers examined whether external attributions more 
interviews noted that the most common physical response to the harassing questions was to smile, but that 
the smile represented the type of smile identified by prior psychological research to signal appeasement and 
accommodation rather than enjoyment.  Id. at 26-27.
30 Cf. Bergman et al., supra note 21, at 237 (“our results and others also show that reporting can harm the 
victim in terms of lowered job satisfaction and greater psychological distress.  Such research suggests that, 
at least in certain work environments, the most ‘reasonable’ course of action for the victim is to avoid 
reporting.”).
31 See, e.g., Kaiser & Miller, A Stress and Coping Perspective, supra note 19, at 168, 173 (explaining their 
own work and citing other studies); Stangor et al., supra note 20 (citing research demonstrating the social 
costs of reporting discrimination).  See generally Crosby, supra note 10, at 169, 170 (discussing social 
norms that depict people who complain as unattractive whiners and malingerers, while promoting the ideal 
of suffering uncomplainingly as noble).
32
  Kaiser & Miller, supra note 22, at 254.  The study involved predominantly white male subjects who read 
a written scenario describing an African American college student who completes a test and is then 
informed that there is some chance, of varying degrees, that the test will be evaluated by a racist judge.  
The accounts varied, with the student being told that one, four, or all of the eight judges (all of whom were 
white) discriminated against African Americans.  In the scenario, the African American student then learns 
that he received a failing grade, after which he completes a survey evaluating the experience and rating the 
factors he believed affected his performance.  The subjects of the study read this account and responded to 
questions designed to reveal their reactions to the African American student.
33
  Interestingly, at the same time that subjects rated the student negatively for claiming discrimination, they 
also rated the student as more “true to self” when he attributed the poor results to discrimination—
suggesting that the subjects might have recognized that discrimination had occurred and gave the student 
some credit for standing up for himself, but devalued him nonetheless for claiming discrimination.  Id.
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generally, and not necessarily attributions to discrimination, might explain the negative 
reactions.  The results of this experiment confirmed that attributions of discrimination by 
an African American student triggered negative reactions towards him, while another 
external attribution, blaming the test, did not.  This research adds to the body of work 
documenting the social costs incurred by members of stigmatized groups when they 
assert claims of discrimination.34
A 2003 follow-up study by the same researchers found that the social penalty 
persists even when the subjects are exposed to persuasive evidence that discrimination 
actually had occurred.35  These results were strikingly similar to the earlier study:  
subjects viewed the African American interviewee more negatively, as a “troublemaker,” 
hypersensitive and irritating, when he blamed racism for his failure to get the job, even 
when the subjects were exposed to direct evidence of the interviewer’s prejudice and 
discrimination.  The authors concluded that social and interpersonal costs continue to 
penalize members of stigmatized groups who report discrimination, and that even direct 
exposure to evidence of prejudice does not temper the negative reactions to persons who 
claim discrimination.36
Social scientists likewise have documented negative reactions to women who 
confront sexism.  One recent study found that women’s confrontations of sexism 
typically generated feelings of hostility or amusement rather than guilt or remorse.37
Another recent study examining men’s and women’s reactions to a woman’s response to 
sexist comments found that men liked the woman less when she confronted sexist 
remarks than when she ignored them.38  The male subjects in the study reserved their 
harshest disapproval for women who confronted comments that were blatantly sexist; 
women who confronted more ambiguous remarks as sexist did not trigger the same 
degree of dislike.39  The researchers accounted for this surprising finding by explaining 
that the women who confronted the more blatant sexism represented a more clear 
34 Id. at 255-56 (describing research documenting the high costs imposed on members of stigmatized 
groups when they report discrimination).
35
  Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Derogating the Victim:  The Interpersonal Consequences of 
Blaming Events on Discrimination, 6(3) GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 227 (2003).  As 
with their 2001 study, the subjects were predominantly white undergraduates who agreed to participate in 
the study.  The earlier experiment design was modified to have the subjects read a portfolio of a job 
interview with the reactions and comments of both the interviewer, who was white, and the interviewee, 
who was African American.  The subjects first read the interviewer’s comments, explaining why the 
interviewee did not get the job, which reflected a range of subtle to blatant racial prejudice.  The subjects 
then read the interviewee’s reactions to the interview, including his perceptions about why he did not get 
the job, which varied from blaming his own interviewing skills and job competition to blaming 
discrimination.
36 Id. at 228-29 (describing the implications of their own work and citing other research demonstrating that 
African Americans anticipate social backlash if they confront discrimination).  The authors speculated that 
the social costs of discrimination-claiming may result in part from the desire to see oneself, and one’s 
social group, as egalitarian.  Id. at 235.
37
 Alexander M. Czopp & Margo J. Monteith, Confronting Prejudice (Literally):  Reactions to 
Confrontations of Racial and Gender Bias, 29(4) PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 532, 541 (2003) 
(stating that “the predominant evaluative sentiment resulting from confrontations about gender biased 
behavior was amusement”).
38
  Dodd et al., supra note 10, at 567.
39 Id. at 575.
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challenge to the social order and transgressed traditional gender role expectations.40
They explained the social penalty as part of a social dynamic punishing role-
transgressions that occur when a member of a stigmatized group challenges social 
hierarchy.41
The greatest social penalty imposed on persons who claim discrimination is 
inflicted by social groups in a position of privilege with respect to the discrimination in 
question.  In the study just described of men’s and women’s reactions to a woman’s 
responses to sexism, the female subjects in the study, in sharp contrast to the male 
subjects, responded more favorably to the woman when she confronted the sexist remarks 
than when she ignored them.42  The researchers explained that the gender difference in 
reactions reflects men’s greater inclination to punish transgressions from expected gender 
roles, and the greater tendency of women to respond more positively to departures from 
gender roles.43  Other research confirms that social group membership significantly 
influences reactions to persons who claim discrimination.44  For example, one study 
found that women and African Americans, acutely aware of the social costs of claiming 
discrimination, were more likely to claim discrimination privately and anonymously or in 
the presence of a member of their same social group, and less likely to do so publicly and 
in the presence of men or white persons, respectively.45  This literature strongly suggests 
that the beneficiaries of the social order are the most likely to resent and punish its 
challengers.
40 Id. (explaining the more tepid reaction to the ambiguous remarks and stating, “perhaps [it was] because 
her unprovoked remark was dismissed as without legitimate cause.  On the other hand, the target woman’s 
response to the clearly sexist remark was legitimate, and as a consequence perhaps made especially salient 
the fact that she was transgressing her gender role by standing up to the man in that situation.”).
41 See, e.g., Swim & Hyers, supra note 23, at 69 (explaining that the dynamic of punishment in response to 
transgressing gender roles contributes to the social constraints that suppress women’s confrontations of 
sexism); Dodd et al., supra note 10, at 568-69 (explaining that when women challenge sexism, the 
“confrontation goes against the more passive, ‘proper’ female gender role prescribed by society”).
42
  Dodd et al., supra note 10, at 574 -75.  The authors noted the Catch-22 this creates for women in mixed-
sex settings, forcing women faced with sexism to choose between being better liked by men or better liked 
and respected by other women.  Id.
43 Id. at 570-75.
44 See, e.g., Kaiser & Miller, A Stress and Coping Perspective, supra note 19, at 168, 173 (explaining 
research finding that women are reluctant to tell members of high-status groups that they have been 
discriminated against).
45
  See Stangor et al., supra note 20, at 69-74.  The women and African American subjects in this study 
were told that they had received a failing grade on a test, and then provided with facts suggesting a varying 
likelihood that discrimination, rather than ability, accounted for the negative results.  Id.  The subjects were 
told that the test measured creativity, and were informed that the grader was male or European American.  
Subjects were then given the grader’s written comments, which disclosed bias towards the subject’s social 
group.  Id.  The subjects were then asked to rate the degree to which certain possible reasons, including 
ability and discrimination, explained their failing score.  The subjects were told in advance that they would 
have to make the rating anonymously or out loud in front of a man/white person or a woman/African 
American.  The study format was similar to that used by Rugiero and Taylor, discussed above, with the 
primary difference being the manipulability of the situation in which the subjects were asked to explain the 
negative test results.  The subjects were much more likely to make attributions of discrimination either 
privately or in the presence of a member of their same social group, and much less likely to do so in the 
presence of a male or white person.  Cf. Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls:  Multiple 
Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 8 (1992) (describing multiple 
consciousness, and discussing the example of a woman of color who shapes her responses in a first year 
criminal law class on rape, depending on the race and gender of the professor).
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Finally, the social costs of claiming discrimination are primarily reserved for low-
power or stigmatized social groups.  White persons and men are less susceptible to social 
costs when they publicly portray themselves as victims of race or sex discrimination.46
When women and persons of color identify and object to discrimination, however, they 
are perceived as transgressing the social order, setting in motion a dynamic that sets the 
stage for retaliation.
C. THE FUNCTION OF RETALIATION:  SILENCING CHALLENGERS AND
PRESERVING EXISTING POWER STRUCTURES
Retaliation performs important work in institutions.  One of the most palpable 
functions of retaliation is to suppress challenges to perceived inequality.  Retaliation 
performs much of this work without ever actually being inflicted on the potential 
challenger.  Decisions about whether to challenge discrimination rest on a careful 
balancing of the costs and benefits of doing so.47  The failure to report or confront 
discrimination often reflects expected social costs rather than an individual’s private, 
benign interpretation of an event.48  For example, women who choose not to confront 
discrimination typically do so because they believe that the costs of confrontation 
outweigh the benefits, while women who report discrimination tend to be more optimistic 
about the likely benefits and costs of doing so.49  An analysis of the costs and benefits of 
reporting discrimination, rather than an “ethic of caretaking” or an aversion to conflict, 
best explains women’s decisions not to report discrimination.50  In this cost-benefit 
46 See, e.g., Stangor et al., supra note 20, at 69-74 (discussing results of control groups using men and 
white persons as discrimination claimants, and showing little evidence of high social costs when men and 
white persons attribute their own negative outcomes to discrimination); Ruggiero & Taylor, supra note 9
(explaining results of their study in which white and male subjects in the control groups did not minimize 
perceived discrimination, but were highly vigilant in perceiving discrimination against themselves).  Cf.
MICHELLE FINE, DISRUPTIVE VOICES:  THE POSSIBILITIES OF FEMINIST RESEARCH 64 (1992) (discussing the 
importance of relative social power as an influence on women’s reactions to discrimination, and noting that 
persons of relatively high social power are more likely to succeed when they assert a single act of “taking 
control,” such as filing a complaint, voicing a grievance, etc., but that “in contrast, the undocumented 
worker who is sexually harassed by her factory foreman might be foolish to file a grievance”).
47 See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 21, at 230-42 (discussing research on whistle-blowing generally and 
sexual harassment specifically finding that persons engage in cost-benefit analysis to decide how to 
respond to wrongdoing).
48
  Swim & Hyers, supra note 23, at 68 (describing research on the influence of social context on 
confronting discrimination and concluding that women who choose not to confront sexism act as “strategic 
negotiators of threatening situations”); Strangor et al., supra note 20, at 69-74 (describing research showing 
that even when persons accurately perceive discrimination, they often choose not to report it because of the 
social costs of doing so); Czopp & Monteith, supra note 37, at 541 (“If confrontations of sexism are 
perceived as likely to yield aversive results, a potential confronter may refrain from challenging future 
sexist acts, unintentionally conveying passive acceptance of such behavior.”).
49
  See A Stress and Coping Perspective, supra note 19, at 168, 169-74; see also Knapp et al., supra note 
21, at 687, 703 (observing that younger workers are more likely to make formal complaints than older 
workers because younger workers have more positive expectations about the reporting process).
50
  See Rudman et al., supra note 21 (describing the results of their study on the comparative impact of 
“procedural justice” and a “caring perspective” as causative factors in the failure to report sexual 
harassment, and finding the former to be more responsible for the under-reporting of sexual harassment).  
The picture that emerges of women in this literature resonates with Professor Kathryn Abrams’ theory of 
partial agency, in which women are constrained by their circumstances, but act as strategic social actors 
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analysis, reporting discrimination is perceived to entail high costs.51  Fear of provoking 
retaliation, in particular, drives many persons to choose not to report or challenge 
discrimination.52
Fears of retaliation turn out to be well-founded.  Retaliation occurs with sufficient 
frequency to justify perceptions of the high costs of reporting discrimination and support 
the rationality of decisions not to do so.53  However, it is not the potential for retaliation 
nonetheless.  See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995).
51 See, e.g., Kaiser & Miller, A Stress and Coping Perspective, supra note 19, at 169 (describing one study 
finding that women perceive confronting sexist remarks to be equally risky to responding with physical 
aggression against the perpetrator); id. at 168, 175 (concluding that fear of the consequences explains much 
of the gap between labeling a behavior as discrimination and confronting those responsible or reporting it 
to others).
52 See, e.g., Dodd et al., supra note 10, at 569 (explaining that fears of not being believed, being retaliated 
against, being humiliated or of having one’s job negatively affected all contribute to the reluctance of 
women to confront sexism); Kaiser & Miller, A Stress and Coping Perspective, supra note 19, at 169 (“The 
most commonly documented barrier to confronting discrimination is interpersonal costs, such as being 
perceived as a troublemaker or experiencing retaliation.”); Knapp et al., supra note 21, at 687, 702 
(identifying fear of retaliation or isolation and not wanting to be labeled a troublemaker or victim as 
primary reasons for not reporting sexual harassment); Fitzgerald & Swan, supra note 21, at 117, 126-37 
(“[s]tudies of victims consistently report that fear of personal or organizational retaliation is the major 
constraint on assertive responding.”); Gutek & Koss, supra note 21, at 39 (explaining that women rarely 
confront or report sexual harassment because they fear that it won’t accomplish anything and fear 
retaliation); cf. Crosby, supra note 10, at 174 (“It is . . . widely known that to speak out against injustice is 
to invite condemnation, and this knowledge, added to the other disincentives, can be enough to assure at 
least temporary silence.”).
53 See, e.g., Jane Adams-Roy & Julian Barling, Predicting the Decision to Confront or Report Sexual 
Harassment, 19(4) J. ORG. BEHAV. 329 (1998) (describing study finding that women who reported sexual 
harassment through formal organizational channels experienced more negative outcomes than those who 
did nothing); Theresa Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 124-25 (2001) (“Many plaintiffs’ lawyers would tell you that once an employee 
complains about discrimination on the job, he or she can usually consider that employment relationship 
over.”); Donna J. Benson & Gregg E. Thomson, Sexual Harassment on a University Campus:  The 
Confluence of Authority Relations, Sexual Interest and Gender Stratification, 29(3) SOC. PROBS. 236, 
244-45 (1982) (discussing results of a study of university students finding that female students who 
confronted their professors about harassment were more likely to experience retaliation than to reestablish a 
mutually satisfying teacher-student relationship); Bergman et al., supra note 21, at 230 -42 (describing 
results of study finding that even in those situations where women believed that confronting the harassment 
“made things better,” empirical outcomes actually demonstrated the opposite); Bingham & Scherer, supra
note 21, at 239, 247-48 (describing results of study showing that making a formal or informal complaint 
produced worse outcomes than alternative responses, such as doing nothing, talking to the harasser, or 
seeking social support); Fitzgerald & Swan, supra note 21, at 117, 122 (describing results of a study of 
state employees finding that 62% of the women who reported sexual harassment experienced retaliation, 
with the most assertive responses triggering the harshest response); id. at 123 (describing results of another 
study finding that one third of the persons who filed formal harassment claims said that “it made things 
worse,” and still another study finding that assertive responses were associated with more negative 
outcomes of every type, even after controlling for the severity of the harassment); Mathew S. Hesson-
McInnis & Louise Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment:  A Preliminary Test of an Integrative Model, 27 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 877, 896 (1997) (“Contrary to conventional wisdom, assertive and formal responses 
were actually associated with more negative outcomes of every sort.”); Knapp et al., supra note 21, at 687, 
711 (“a very common negative reaction experienced by women who officially complain is public 
humiliation.”); Janet P. Near & Tamila C. Jensen, The Whistleblowing Process:  Retaliation and Perceived 
Effectiveness, 10(1) WORK & OCCUPATIONS 3-28 (1983) (describing the results of their study on women 
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in the abstract that effectively silences challenges.  Retaliation occurs within an 
institutional context, and institutions retain a great degree of control over the extent to 
which fears of retaliation silence potential claims of discrimination.  The organizational 
climate, including institutional norms and the organization’s tolerance for discrimination 
and retaliation, has a profound influence on how persons choose to respond to perceived 
discrimination.54  If a target believes, based on past observations, that confronting or 
reporting discrimination is likely to trigger retaliation, she will be much less inclined to 
engage in such a response.55  Retaliation has heightened power to silence discrimination 
claims within institutions that have a high tolerance for discrimination and retaliation.56
The other important work performed by retaliation is to preserve institutional 
power structures in the process of fending off challenges to them.  Retaliation performs 
this function both when it is actually inflicted and when the threat of retaliation 
disproportionately chills complaints by persons with relatively lower social and 
institutional power.  As a social and institutional practice, retaliation plays off and 
magnifies existing power disparities between the challengers and the beneficiaries of 
discrimination.
Retaliation is more likely to occur against vulnerable employees who lack the 
support of organizational powerbrokers.57  Conversely, the more support a target receives 
from important persons within the organization, the less likely the target will be subjected 
to retaliation.58  Because low-power persons are particularly susceptible to retaliation, the 
fear of retaliation is particularly chilling and all the more effective in silencing their 
opposition.59  The fear of retaliation is particularly debilitating for persons with low-
institutional power across multiple dimensions.  For example, women who are especially 
isolated and tokens in their jobs, women in nontraditional employment, and women who 
who filed sex discrimination complaints against their employer with the Wisconsin Equal Rights Division, 
finding that 40% of the women reported experiencing retaliation).
54 See, e.g., Knapp et al., supra note 21, at 687, 712; see also id. at 707-08 (discussing literature on 
whistleblowing showing that organizations that are more hierarchical, bureaucratic and authoritarian are 
also more likely to ignore dissent and suppress whistleblowing).
55 Id. at 711 (discussing research showing that beliefs about the potential efficacy of reporting and the 
likelihood of retaliation shape the formation of targets’ responses); id. at 699-700 (discussing research 
showing a “feedback loop” where past outcomes of responses to harassment influence expectancies for 
future outcomes, and thus shape present responses).
56 See, e.g., Fitzgerald & Swan, supra note 21, at 117 (discussing research showing that when the severity 
of the harassment was controlled for, the most powerful predictor of reporting was organizational context 
and the organizational norms and culture that also correlate with the likelihood of sexual harassment); 
Bingham & Scherer, supra note 21, at 245 (observing that the likelihood of individuals complaining to 
organizational authorities depends on their perception of whether the organization will take the complaint 
seriously and assist in resolving the situation).
57
  See Near & Jensen, supra note 53, at 14, 21, 23 (reporting results of a study of women who filed sex 
discrimination complaints against their employers with the Equal Rights Division of Wisconsin finding 
perceived support of top management to be inversely related to the comprehensiveness of retaliation).
58 See, e.g., Benson & Thomson, supra note 53, at 236, 232.
59 See, e.g., Knapp et al., supra note 21, at 687, 694-96 (explaining research showing that targets of sexual 
harassment are least likely to report or confront the harassment when the perpetrator is a supervisor or other 
person with higher organizational power); id. at 704-05 (explaining converse finding that persons of higher 
occupational status who wield more power within the organization are more likely to report the harassment 
because they are better positioned to avoid retaliation).
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are especially vulnerable in their jobs are more likely to be silenced by the threat or fear 
of retaliation.60
At the same time that retaliation preys on the most vulnerable persons in 
institutions, it simultaneously magnifies the power of high-status persons to engage in 
discrimination.  Power relations between the perpetrator and target greatly influence how 
the organization responds to reports of discrimination.  Organizations are more likely to 
remedy discrimination when the targets of discrimination are higher-status, and least 
likely to do so where a lower-status target complains of discrimination by a higher-status 
perpetrator.61  As the perpetrator’s power increases relative to the target, reporting 
discrimination is less likely to lead to a positive outcome for the target.62  The potential 
for retaliation increases as the power disparity widens between a low-status target and a 
higher-status perpetrator.63  Perhaps not surprisingly, then, women and men of color tend 
to file a disproportionate number of retaliation claims.64  The greater the power disparity 
between the wrongdoer and the victim, the greater the extent to which the victim’s 
resistance deviates from prescribed institutional and social positions, and the more likely 
it is that organizational members will sanction the challenger.65  Retaliation thus serves as 
a mechanism to maintain hierarchies within institutions and restore the social norms that 
are challenged by claims of wrongdoing.66
Like discrimination, retaliation is a product of existing organizational climate and 
structures.67  It is more likely to occur in organizations with a high tolerance for, and 
60 Id. at 704 (“gender pioneers do not expect that they will be supported, and are more isolated, and under 
great pressure to ‘fit in’”).
61
  See Bergman et al., supra note 21, at 239 (“Organizations are less likely to take action against high-
status perpetrators, and as the organizational power and status of the perpetrator increase, the likelihood of 
organizational action decreases.”).
62
  See Bingham & Sherer, supra note 21, at 244, 260.  Not surprisingly, employees also report lower levels 
of satisfaction with the outcome of reporting harassment when they perceived their work climate as tending 
to encourage sexual harassment.  Id. at 261.
63
  See Cortina et al., supra note 22, at 235, 259 (citing and explaining their 2001 study of federal court 
employees, which showed that retaliation increased when employees spoke out against more powerful 
organizational members); see also Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: 
Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8(4) J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL.
247-65 (2003) (explaining that the relative social positions of the target and the perpetrator affect both the 
form and likelihood of retaliation).
64
  See National Partnership for Women & Families, “Women at Work:  Looking Behind the Numbers,” at 
12 (July 2004) (available at http://app.nationalpartnership.org/docs/CRA%2040th%20Ann%20Report.
pd) (analyzing 2003 EEOC data and reporting that 30% of retaliation claims are filed by women of color, 
27% by men of color, 26% by white women, and only 11% by white men).
65
  See Cortina et al., supra note 22, at 235, 259 (explaining that exposing the misbehavior of a highly 
placed person in an organization questions the hierarchy of the organization, causing the dominant coalition 
to retaliate in order to restore organizational hierarchy); id. at 259 (explaining that whistle-blowing by a 
lower status person against higher-status persons is seen as “deviant behavior and a more serious offense in 
a socially stratified society . . .  likely to evoke the greatest sanction”).
66
  See Cortina & Magley, supra note 63, at 247-65 (“organizations use retaliation to maintain social 
control over dissidents and restore group norms”).  Cf. Marcia A. Parmalee et al., Correlates of 
Whistleblowers’ Perceptions of Organizational Retaliation, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 17 (1982) (discussing 
research suggesting that retaliation can be used for diverse purposes, including silencing, discrediting and 
damaging dissidents and punishing vulnerable challengers in order to warn other persons against challenges 
to authority, and explaining the challenge to organizational authority that whistleblowing presents).
67
  Cortina & Magley, supra note 63, at 247-65; Near & Jensen, supra note 53.  Cf. Parmalee et al., supra
note 66, at 17, 30 (contending that even the acts of individual supervisors are part of an organizational 
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incidence of, discrimination.68  The relationship between discrimination and retaliation is 
reciprocal: just as the tolerance for discrimination increases the likelihood of retaliation, 
retaliation also encourages further discrimination.69
III.  THE PROMISE OF THE RETALIATION CLAIM:
ADVANCING THE BOUNDARIES AND IDEALS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW
The realities of retaliation in response to claiming discrimination necessitate 
strong legal protection from retaliation if the law is to provide meaningful 
nondiscrimination guarantees.  However, despite the connections developed in the social 
science literature between retaliation and the furtherance of discrimination, current legal 
understandings of discrimination require some theoretical stretching to encompass 
retaliation.  The disconnect between retaliation and discrimination under existing doctrine 
recently came to a head in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,70 which required 
the Court to decide whether Title IX implies a private right of action for retaliation.  An 
appreciation of the complexity of the issue in Jackson provides the opening to a broader 
rethinking of the boundaries of discrimination law and its relationship to retaliation.  This 
section contends that recognizing retaliation as a form of discrimination necessarily 
pushes the boundaries of current discrimination law in productive ways, both in terms of 
the scope of the antidiscrimination project and the values underlying discrimination law.
process, and explaining that the support of top management strongly influences retaliation, demonstrating 
that retaliation is an organizational response, and not the act of lone individuals); Benson & Thomson, 
supra note 53, at 232 (“Organizational responses may function as a continuation of the harassing behaviors, 
in that negative organizational responses (e.g., retaliation) may further victimize the harassment target.  
Thus, job-gender context may influence responses to reports in much the same way that it affects sexual 
harassment.”).
68
  See Bergman et al., supra note 21, at 236-37 (stating that, “[r]etaliation and minimization [of the 
harassment] were associated with higher perpetrator rank, more negative organizational climates, and 
greater frequency of sexual harassment,” and noting that, as organizational tolerance for sexual harassment 
increases, so does retaliation for reporting for it); Fitzgerald et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Sexual 
Harassment in Organizations:  A Test of an Integrated Model, 82(4) J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 578, 586 (1997) 
(explaining that discrimination in organizations is a function of organizational climate, including the 
communicated tolerance for discrimination, and structural factors such as the gender ratio of jobs and the 
gendered nature of job responsibilities); cf. Czopp & Monteith, supra note 37, at 532, 534, 536 (citing 
research showing that low-prejudice people react to discovering their biases with feelings of guilt, whereas 
high prejudice participants were more likely to react with feelings of anger and irritation).
69 Research by social psychologists has shown that the social influence of hearing someone either condemn 
or condone racism strongly affects subjects’ reactions to racism. See Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., 
Condemning and Condoning Racism:  A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79(6) J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 993, 995 (1994) (reporting results of campus study exploring the effects of the expression of 
social opinions on racism, and concluding that hearing statements condoning racism increased the subject’s 
own racist sentiments.  The authors found that this phenomenon occurred regardless of the race of the 
person condoning racism, and concluded that racist sentiment is malleable, and that reducing the social 
constraints on prejudice has the potential to cause increased racism.).
70
   125 S. Ct. 1497 (Mar. 29, 2005).
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A.  JACKSON V. BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
COTNROVERSY OVER IMPLYING A RETALIATION CLAIM FROM A BAN 
ON DISCRIMINATION
The Jackson case forced the Court to confront the relationship between retaliation 
and discrimination in order to decide whether retaliation against complaining about a 
perceived Title IX violation is a form of intentional discrimination on the basis of sex.  
Although many nondiscrimination statutes, including Title VII,71 the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act,72 and the Americans with Disabilities Act,73 explicitly prohibit 
retaliation, Title IX does not mention retaliation.  Because Title IX is interpreted 
similarly to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,74 which prohibits race 
discrimination in federally funded programs and which is also silent with respect to 
retaliation, the Court’s ruling in Jackson should also decide the fate of retaliation claims 
under Title VI.75  Regulations issued by the Department of Education have long 
prohibited retaliation for asserting rights under both of these statutes,76 but the statutory 
silence left lower courts to struggle with whether to recognize an implied private right of 
action for retaliation under Title VI and Title IX.77  The Court’s decision in Jackson to 
imply a retaliation claim from the general prohibition on sex discrimination also has 
implications for other legal sources of equality rights that are silent with respect to 
retaliation, including 42 U.S.C. §1983,78 the primary vehicle for asserting equal 
protection, and the Reconstruction statutes, sections 1981,79 1982,80 and 1985.81
71
  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.  In language that serves as a model for other statutory bans on retaliation, Title VII 
states:
It shall be an unlawful practice for an employer to discriminate against any of its 
employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice, made 
an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
this title.  Id.
72
  29 U.S.C. § 623(d).
73
  42 U.S.C. § 12203.
74
  42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
75 See, e.g., Litman v. George Mason Univ., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3533 (4th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) 
(4th Cir. 2004) (vacating and remanding the district court’s dismissal of a Title IX retaliation claim in light 
of a Fourth Circuit decision holding that Title VI includes a private right of action for retaliation, and 
noting that Title IX and Title VI should be interpreted in the same manner).
76
  See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (“No recipient [of federal funds] or other person shall intimidate, threaten, 
coerce, or discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege 
secured by section [Title IX or Title VI] of the Act or this part, or because he has made a complaint, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under [Title IX 
or Title VI]”).  Both Title VI and Title IX explicitly authorize federal agencies to promulgate regulations 
interpreting and enforcing the statutory ban on discrimination.  42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (Title VI, § 602); 20 
U.S.C. § 1682 (Title IX, § 902).
77
  For a discussion of the split in the courts over whether to recognize implied private rights of action for 
retaliation under Title IX and Title VI, see Bradford C. Mank, Are Anti-Retaliation Regulations in Title VI 
or Title IX Enforceable in a Private Right of Action:  Does Sandoval or Sullivan Control This Question?, 
35 SETON HALL L. REV. 47 (2004).
78
  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (prohibiting deprivations of federal rights under color of state law).
79
  42 U.S.C. § 1981 (prohibiting race discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts).  Cf. 
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In Jackson, a male teacher and coach of the girl’s high school basketball team at 
Ensley High School in Birmingham, Alabama, alleged retaliation for complaining about 
the unequal funding and unequal access to athletic facilities and equipment allotted to his 
team.82  School officials responded by relieving him of his coaching position.83  Mr. 
Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education in federal court, alleging retaliation 
under Title IX and the Department of Education regulation barring retaliation for 
assertions of rights under Title IX.  The district court dismissed the lawsuit on the ground 
that Title IX does not include an implied cause of action for retaliation.  The Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed, citing the absence of textual support in Title IX for a retaliation claim 
and contrasting Title IX’s silence with Title VII’s express prohibition on retaliation.84
While the Jackson case worked its way up to the high Court, the Fourth Circuit 
reached the opposite result in a case decided under Title VI.  In Peters v. Jenney,85 a 
white female teacher and director of the school’s gifted program alleged retaliation for 
her advocacy of changes to the program’s selection criteria, which disproportionately 
excluded African American students and, she believed, violated Title VI.  The school 
district responded by removing her from her position as director of the program.  Her 
challenge to the school district fared better in the lower courts than the retaliation claim 
in Jackson.  The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, finding 
the absence of statutory language on retaliation less significant and citing earlier 
precedent recognizing protection from retaliation as implicit in a prohibition on 
discrimination.86  Several district courts weighed in on both sides of the controversy 
before the Supreme Court took up the Jackson case.87
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 637 (6th ed. 2003) (observing that, even though recent appellate decisions 
have found implicit protection from retaliation in § 1981, “the interpretation cannot be considered settled” 
in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)).
80
  42 U.S.C. § 1982 (prohibiting race discrimination in property transactions).  Although the Supreme 
Court previously recognized an implied private right of action for retaliation under this statute in Sullivan v. 
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), more recent Supreme Court precedent raised questions 
about the ongoing validity of Sullivan.  See, e.g., Mock v. South Dakota Bd. of Trustees, 267 F. Supp. 2d 
1017 (D.S.D. 2003) (ruling that Title IX does not create an implied private right of action for retaliation and 
questioning whether Sullivan survives the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 
275 (2001)).  The Jackson decision put these doubts to rest, reaffirming Sullivan and construing that 
decision as recognizing implicit protection from retaliation in a broad nondiscrimination guarantee, and not 
merely allowing third party standing to assert nondiscrimination rights on behalf of others.  125 S. Ct. 
1497, 1505-1506 & n.1 (2005).
81
  42 U.S.C. § 1985 (prohibiting a conspiracy to violate federal civil rights).
82
  125 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 (Mar. 29, 2005).
83
  Mr. Jackson was not fired outright, since the school district retained him as a teacher, but he lost his 
supplemental pay for coaching.  125 S. Ct. at 1503.
84 Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir., Oct. 21, 2002), cert. granted 71 
U.S.L.W. 3736 (June 14, 2004).  The Court granted certiorari on the question, “does a private right of 
action for violations of Title IX encompass redress for retaliation for complaints about unlawful sex 
discrimination?”  71 U.S.L.W. 3736 (U.S. June 14, 2004).
85
  327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003).
86 Id. at 317-18 (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (recognizing an implied 
private right of action for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. §1982, even though the statute does not mention 
retaliation)).  The Peters court also cited circuit court precedent recognizing a private right of action for 
retaliation under 42 U.S.C. §1981.  See Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 576 (6th Cir. 
2000) (permitting white plaintiff allegedly retaliated against for opposing discrimination to bring suit under 
§ 1981); Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian Sch., 631 F.2d 1144, 1149 n.7 (4th Cir. 1980) (same); Murrell v. 
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The issue before the Court in Jackson turned on whether the statutory ban on sex 
discrimination implicitly encompasses a private right of action for retaliation against 
persons who complain of discrimination.88  The Supreme Court ruled that it did, finding 
Title IX’s ban on sex discrimination broad enough to encompass protection from 
retaliation notwithstanding the statute’s silence on this question.  The Court’s ability to 
coherently situate retaliation within a ban on discrimination ultimately turns on how 
broadly or narrowly it construes “discrimination.”  However, neither the Supreme Court 
nor the lower courts that have recognized retaliation claims have fully engaged the 
complexity of the relationship between retaliation and discrimination under existing law.  
The question in Jackson is a surprisingly challenging one because current Supreme Court 
precedent construes discrimination narrowly, thus making it difficult to imply protection 
from retaliation from a general ban on discrimination.  
1. The Disconnect Between Retaliation and Discrimination Under Existing 
Precedent
One important precedent complicating the issue in Jackson is Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 89 in which the Court limited implied private rights of action under Title VI to 
only those actions that allege intentional race discrimination.  Sandoval involved a Title 
VI challenge to an Alabama Department of Motor Vehicles rule refusing to offer driver’s 
license tests in Spanish.  The plaintiffs alleged that the practice had a racially disparate 
impact on Latinos and Latinas, relying on an agency regulation interpreting Title VI to 
prohibit practices that disparately harm a racial group without sufficient justification.90
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim, ruling that the disparate impact regulation did not 
create a private right of action because it exceeded the scope of the statute, which 
Ocean Mecca Motel, Inc., 262 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognizing a private right of action under 
§ 1981 for a white motel customer evicted due to association with black customers); Phelps v. Wichita 
Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding § 1981 claim by plaintiff, a white 
attorney, who was allegedly subjected to adverse action because of his representation of black clients, if he 
can show that he was deprived of an interest protected by § 1981); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 
F.2d 1439, 1447 (10th Cir. 1988) (recognizing § 1981 action by white employee allegedly terminated for 
assisting a black employee).  These decisions, however, stand in some tension with the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Sandoval, discussed infra.  See, e.g., Mock v. South Dakota Board of Regents, 267 F. Supp. 2d 
1017 (D.S.D. 2003) (interpreting Sandoval as explicitly disavowing the method used in Sullivan to find a 
private right of action based on the usefulness of providing such a remedy).
87 Compare Chandamuri v. Georgetown University, 274 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.D.C. 2003) (siding with the 
Fourth Circuit and implying a private right of action under Title VI), and Johnson v. Galen Health 
Institutes, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 679 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (same), with Mock v. South Dakota Board of 
Regents, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D.S.D. 2003) (siding with the Eleventh Circuit in refusing to recognize a 
private right of action for retaliation under Title IX); and Atkinson v. Lafayette College, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1432 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (relying on Sandoval, discussed infra, to dismiss the plaintiff’s Title IX 
retaliation claim alleging that she was removed from her position as athletic director for initiating an open 
discussion of Title IX/athletics compliance issues at the college where she worked).
88
  The Court chose not to rely on the Department of Education regulation prohibiting retaliation as the 
source of the retaliation action, forcing it to locate the retaliation claim squarely within the statute’s 
nondiscrimination guarantee.  125 S. Ct. at 1506-1507. 
89
  532 U.S. 275 (2001).
90
  See 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (1999); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2000).  Section 602 of Title VI authorizes 
federal agencies which are empowered to extend Federal assistance to promulgate regulations to enforce 
Title VI.  42 U.S.C. §2000d-1.
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prohibits only intentional discrimination.91  Because the Court found that the disparate 
impact regulation proscribes practices that are permitted by the ban on intentional 
discrimination, the regulation fell outside of the statute’s implied private right of action.92
As Justice Scalia explained for the five-member majority, “[a]gencies may play the 
sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer himself.”93
The Sandoval decision limits the Court to implying private rights of action only 
for claims of intentional discrimination under Title VI, and by extension Title IX.  
Recognizing implicit protection from retaliation under Title IX thus required the Court to 
situate retaliation within the category of intentional sex discrimination.94  Doing so, 
however, puts some pressure on the category of intentional discrimination as it has 
developed in modern discrimination doctrine.  Notwithstanding the interdependence of 
discrimination and retaliation in the real world, it is not so easy to conceptualize 
retaliation as a form of intentional discrimination under the current dominant 
framework.95
Intentional discrimination, also known as differential treatment and distinguished 
from disparate impact, typically denotes unfavorable treatment directed at someone 
because of his or her race, sex or other protected class status.  The touchstone of the 
retaliation claim, on the other hand, is that the complainant was retaliated against for his 
or her actions opposing discrimination.  The difference is apparent from the Jackson case 
itself.  The coach, an African American male, did not claim that he was fired because of 
his sex or that a female coach who raised Title IX concerns would have fared better, but 
91
  The Court first limited Title VI to intentional discrimination in dicta in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  In Sandoval, the Court assumed without deciding that the 
regulations promulgated under § 602 of the statute could validly proscribe disparate impact for the purposes 
of agency enforcement of the statute, but ruled that they could not do so for the purposes of creating an 
implied private right of action in court.  Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281.  The Court first recognized a private 
right of action to enforce Title IX in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), and an implied 
private right of action for damages under Title IX in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 
60 (1992).  The Court’s discussion in Sandoval relies on these decisions as the departure point for the Title 
VI analysis as well.  Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-81.
92
  The Court concluded that unlike § 601, which sets out the core nondiscrimination guarantee, § 602, 
which authorizes the agency to promulgate regulations, does not create an implied private right of action.  
The Court’s analysis reflects its increasingly strict approach, relying primarily on the text and structure of 
the statute, to interpreting whether to infer an implied private right of action from a statute that is silent on 
the question.  Id. at 287-88.  The Court rejected an alternative approach that would interpret statutes to 
implicitly include such remedies as necessary to give effect to congressional intent.  Id. at 287.  Four 
Justices dissented.  Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 291.  The Court’s own absence from the sorcerer/apprentice metaphor promotes the façade that the 
limits of statutory meaning are set by Congress and that  the agency must abide by those limits.  The 
metaphor obscures the Court’s own role in creating meaning, first in limiting the statute to intentional 
discrimination and then in setting the disparate impact regulation as too far removed to qualify as a 
reasonable vindication of that principle.  On the legitimating role of metaphor in Supreme Court rhetoric, 
see generally Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181 (2004).
94
  Although not every court has decided the retaliation issue under Title VI and Title IX with reference to 
the space left by Sandoval, see, e.g., Frazier v. Fairhaven School Community, 276 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(assuming that Title IX includes an implied private right of action without mentioning or considering 
Sandoval), the meaning and implications of Sandoval are central to the analysis, since any congruity 
between retaliation and intentional discrimination is far from obvious.
95 See, e.g., Peters, 327 F.3d at 318 (asserting a “symbiotic and inseparable relationship” between 
retaliation and intentional discrimination, but failing to specify the nature or contours of that relationship).
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that he experienced retaliation for his actions on behalf of his female students.96  Unlike 
the prototypical intentional discrimination model, the retaliation claim asserts that the 
harm was inflicted because of the complainant’s actions, apart from his or her protected 
class status.
The Court’s intentional discrimination jurisprudence, on the other hand, generally 
insists on status-based harm to an individual.  For example, in Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, Inc.,97 the Court reminded lower courts and litigants that a Title VII 
sex discrimination plaintiff must always establish that the adverse treatment occurred 
because of the plaintiff’s sex. In Oncale, the plaintiff, an employee working on an oil rig, 
alleged that he was sexually harassed by his male coworkers, who sexually and 
physically assaulted him and threatened him with rape.98  The lower courts had rejected 
the plaintiff’s Title VII claim, reasoning that male-to-male harassment can never amount 
to discrimination based on the plaintiff’s sex.99  The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that 
same-sex harassment may amount to sex-based discrimination, as long as the plaintiff 
proves that he was singled out for the harassment because of his sex.100 With this 
understanding, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts for futher proceedings.101
Under the Court’s reasoning, if Mr. Oncale had instead claimed that he was harassed 
because of his opposition to company policy, his claim for sex discrimination would have 
failed unless he could show that a female worker who engaged in similar activity would 
have been treated better.102  A plaintiff who suffers adverse treatment because of 
something she has or has not done, as opposed to her status, generally can not succeed on 
a claim for intentional discrimination.  
To give another example, in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney,103 an equal protection challenge to the state’s veterans’ preference for civil 
service jobs, the state’s policy discriminated between persons based on whether they had 
served in the military.  The veteran’s preference did not, in the Court’s view, treat the 
plaintiffs differently because they were women, but because of something they had not 
done—albeit something that many men but very few women had done.104  Likewise, the 
96
 125 S. Ct. at 1511.
97
  523 U.S. 75 (1998).
98
  Id. at 77.
99
  83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
100
  523 U.S. at 80-81.  The Court then listed several ways a plaintiff could prove the because-of-sex 
element in a same-sex harassment case, such as: by showing that the harasser was homosexual and that the 
same overtures would not have been made to a person of the other sex; with evidence that the harassment 
took such a sex-specific and derogatory form that it supports an inference that the harasser was motivated 
by a general hostility to members of the plaintiff’s sex in the workplace; or by comparative evidence 
showing how the harasser treats members of both sexes in the workplace.  Id.
101
  Id. at 82.
102
  Some theories of harassment would permit such a claim to succeed, even if the reason for the 
harassment was the reporting of non-gender related rule violations, because of the sexual and sex-typed 
nature of the harassment.  See Deborah Brake, The Cruelest of the Gender Police:  Student-to-Student 
Sexual Harassment and Anti-Gay Peer Harassment Under Title IX, 1 GEO. J. GENDER L. 37, 76-82 (1999) 
(explaining and critiquing a “sexual-in-nature” model of sexual harassment).  However, the Court in 
Oncale viewed the sexual nature of the harassment as insufficient by itself to establish the because-of-sex 
requirement.
103
  442 U.S. 256 (1979).
104
  The Court in Feeney discounted the obvious link between status and acts in this context, refusing to 
acknowledge how sex constrained military service given the military’s significant hurdles to military 
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much-criticized “Don’t ask, don’t tell” policy toward gays and lesbians in the military has 
been salvaged from equal protection challenges by framing it as an act-based, rather than 
a status-based, ban.105  While this distinction has been justly criticized for assuming a 
clear line between actions and status, and for obscuring how acts produce subjects and 
how status merges with actions,106 its acceptance by most courts demonstrates the 
salience of the act/status distinction in discrimination law, casting the Court’s contrasting 
treatment of retaliation claims into stark relief.  The Court’s Title IX cases have followed 
this same model of intentional discrimination, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that the 
adverse treatment occurred because of their sex.107
2. The Reconciliation of Retaliation and Discrimination in Jackson
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Jackson glossed over these difficulties by 
repeatedly and insistently asserting that retaliation for complaining about sex 
discrimination is a form of intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, with little 
explanation or analysis.108  In its failure to engage or acknowledge the distance between 
retaliation for a person’s actions and the dominant status-based framework of intentional 
discrimination, the Jackson decision is remarkably under-theorized.  Neither the Jackson
majority nor lower court decisions recognizing an implied right of action for retaliation 
have satisfactorily explained why retaliation counts as a form of intentional
discrimination based on protected class status.
The Court’s primary, if not fully articulated, rationale for situating retaliation 
under the intentional discrimination umbrella rests on the premise that retaliation 
amounts to intentional discrimination because opposition to intentional discrimination 
service for women and its encouragement and enforcement of military service for men.  Id. at 276-78.  By 
obscuring this connection, the Court was able to pretend that the discrimination at issue was based on past 
military service without regard to the sex-based status of the persons eligible for the veterans’ preference.  
Id. at 278 (“. . . the history of discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in this case”).  
The Court’s refusal to see the link between status and acts in this case reflects its emphatic adherence to an 
act/status distinction.
105 See, e.g., Holmes v. California Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1996); Philips v. Perry, 106 
F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997); Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 
F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomason v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
106 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Status/Conduct Distinction in the 1993 Revisions to Military Anti-Gay 
Policy:  A Legal Archaeology, 3 GLQ:  J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 159 (1996).
107 See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633-35 (1999); Franklin v. Gwinnett 
County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
108 See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1504 (“Retaliation against a person because that person has complained 
of sex discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by Title IX’s private 
cause of action.”); id. (“…retaliation is discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ because it is an intentional 
response to the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.”); id. (“We conclude that when 
a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes 
intentional ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX.”); id. at 1507 (“As we explained 
above,… the text of Title IX prohibits a funding recipient from retaliating against a person who speaks out 
against sex discrimination, because such retaliation is intentional ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex.’”); 
id. (“…we hold that Title IX’s private right of action encompasses suits for retaliation, because retaliation 
falls within the statute’s prohibition of intentional discrimination on the basis of sex.”); id. at 1507 n.2 
(“We interpret Title IX’s text to clearly prohibit retaliation for complaints about sex discrimination.”); id. at 
1507 n.3 (“Because, as we explain above,… retaliation in response to a complaint about sex discrimination 
is ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ the statute clearly protects those who suffer such retaliation.”).
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art23
25
triggered the retaliation.109  This approach treats the retaliation as a cover-up for the 
underlying unlawful discrimination, such that the retaliation gets folded into the illegality 
of the discrimination itself.  To return to a variation on the Oncale hypothetical from 
above, the analogy would be if Mr. Oncale was targeted for the harassment because he 
had challenged an employment policy barring the hiring of women on the oil rig.  The 
retaliation would amount to an extension of the unlawful discrimination, an action 
intentionally taken to continue the company policy of unlawful discrimination against 
women.  The majority opinion in Jackson invoked this theory by locating the “on the 
basis of sex” requirement in the nature of the complaint that triggers the retaliatory 
action.110  Under this theory, retaliation is a form of intentional discrimination because it 
is part of an intentional cover-up and continuation of a policy of intentional 
discrimination.
The difficulty with this theory is that it turns on the existence of underlying 
intentional discrimination, which the retaliatory act furthers.  Yet, as Justice Thomas 
correctly pointed out in dissent, courts have never required—nor should they require, for 
reasons developed at length in the latter part of this Article—retaliation claims to be 
premised on the existence of actual, unlawful discrimination underlying the oppositional 
action.111  It is as well-established as any doctrine in discrimination law that a plaintiff 
may succeed on a retaliation claim even if the assertion of underlying unlawful 
discrimination turns out to be incorrect.112  Of course, there is some limit to how far the 
challenged conduct may stray from the category of unlawful discrimination, as discussed 
later in this Article, but no court recognizing a cause of action for retaliation has required 
proof of underlying unlawful discrimination as a prerequisite.  
The majority did not disagree with Justice Thomas’s statement of the law on this 
point, nor did it explain how the retaliation claim meets the “on the basis of sex” 
requirement if it turns out that the underlying conduct did not amount to illegal sex 
discrimination at all.  Given that there is some room for slippage between the subject of 
the complaint that provokes the retaliation and the boundaries of unlawful intentional 
discrimination, the Court’s approach, which views retaliation as an extension of the 
109
  The Solicitor General relied on a similar theory in its litigation position as amicus curiae in support of 
the plaintiff.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, in Jackson v. 
Birmingham Board of Education, No. 02-1672 (Aug. 19, 2004), at 6 (explaining that petitioner’s retaliation 
claim falls within the ban on intentional discrimination “because he claims that respondent engaged in 
intentional discrimination”); see also Peters, 327 F.3d at 318 (describing retaliation as “a means of 
implementing or actually engaging in intentional discrimination by encouraging such discrimination and 
removing or punishing those who oppose it or refuse to engage in it”).
110
   See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1504 (“…retaliation is discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ because it is an 
intentional response to the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.”); see also id. at 
1507 (“Where the retaliation occurs because the complainant speaks out about sex discrimination, the ‘on 
the basis of sex’ requirement is satisfied.”); id. at 1507 n.3 (“Because…retaliation in response to a 
complaint about sex discrimination is ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ the statute clearly protects 
those who suffer such retaliation.”). 
111
  See Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1512 (“…a retaliation claimant need not prove that the complained-of sex 
discrimination happened.  Although this Court has never addressed the question, no Court of Appeals 
requires a complainant to show more than that he had a reasonable, good faith belief that discrimination 
occurred in order to prevail on a retaliation claim.  Retaliation therefore cannot be said to be discrimination 
on the basis of anyone’s sex, because a retaliation claim may succeed where no sex discrimination ever 
took place.”) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
112
  See infra text at notes 158-160.
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underlying discrimination, runs into the very problem in Sandoval:  that the private right 
of action would “forbid conduct that [the statute] permits,” namely, conduct other than 
intentional discrimination.113
Some lower courts have invoked a similar theory to connect retaliation to 
intentional discrimination by analogizing to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, 
which protects the decision to exercise a constitutional right from government 
punishment.114  The majority in Jackson did not resort to this doctrine, and doing so 
would not have strengthened its effort to fold retaliation into the ban on intentional 
discrimination.  The problem with the analogy to unconstitutional conditions is the same 
as the problem with the cover-up theory: retaliation claimants need not prove that the 
conduct they challenged actually amounted to unlawful discrimination.  This is a key 
difference between the retaliation claim and the law of unconstitutional conditions.  
Government actions discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights cross the line only 
when there is an actual constitutional right at stake.  Punishing someone for doing 
something that does not amount to the exercise of a constitutional right does not trigger 
the doctrine’s protection.  For example, the Court has held that depriving women of 
Medicaid funds for abortion does not place an unconstitutional condition on the exercise 
of the abortion right because the abortion right includes only the right to freedom from 
government obstruction, and not a right to equal subsidization or to actually obtain an 
abortion.115  Of course, the framing of the right at stake in the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions is famously malleable, as much scholarship demonstrates.116  Nevertheless, the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions requires an assertion of an actual constitutional 
right that is burdened.117  The retaliation claim, on the other hand, forbids retaliation for 
asserting discrimination even if the underlying conduct did not amount to unlawful 
113
  See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285 (“It is clear now that the disparate-impact regulations do not simply 
apply § 601—since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits—and therefore clear that the private right 
of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these regulations.”).
114 See, e.g., Chandamuri v. Georgetown, 274 F. Supp. 2d 71, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2003) (drawing on the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to explain why bans on discrimination must include protection from 
retaliation); cf. Crawford-El v. Briton, 523 U.S. 574, 589 n.10 (1998) (explaining that retaliation for 
exercising a constitutional right “offends the Constitution [because] it inhibit[s] exercise of a protected 
right,” and “is thus akin to an unconstitutional condition demanded for the receipt of a government benefit 
provided.”).
115
  See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
116 See, e.g., Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 155-56 (1996) (explaining the circularity 
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because it does not specify the nature of the rights to be 
protected and “fails to specify whether the parameters of those rights are contingent upon the granting of 
the benefit”); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416-1417 (1988) 
(summarizing inconsistencies in the Court’s application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); 
David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions:  Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded 
Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 679-80 (1992) (criticizing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions for 
its insensitivity to the constitutional values central to the underlying right); Seth Kreimer, Allocational 
Sanctions:  The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293,1324-26 
(critiquing the distinction between positive and negative rights as it is used to demarcate unconstitutional 
conditions) (1984). 
117
  See Sullivan, supra note 116, at 1427 (explaining that “the constitutional interest at issue must rise to 
the level of a recognized right” in order to trigger the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions).  Cf. Cass R. 
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism, 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990) 
(arguing for the elimination of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions altogether because it obscures 
central questions about the scope of the underlying right).
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discrimination.  The retaliation right is thus distinct from the right to nondiscrimination in 
a way that protection from unconstitutional conditions is not distinct from the underlying 
constitutional right.
The Jackson majority’s second attempt to reconcile retaliation with intentional 
discrimination under existing law is no more satisfying.  In reasoning that appears to 
provide an alternative rationale from the cover-up theory criticized above, the majority 
accepted retaliation as a form of intentional discrimination because the retaliation claim is 
an important remedy to effectuate the statute’s ban on intentional discrimination.  As the 
Court observed, Title IX’s remedial scheme would greatly suffer without protection from 
retaliation.118  The Court is certainly correct that protection from retaliation plays an 
important remedial role in effectuating a ban on discrimination, and retaliation has often 
been described as remedial in nature.119  By invoking the remedial rationale, the Court 
suggested the possibility that even if retaliation itself is not a species of intentional 
discrimination, it should still be encompassed by the statute because it is an important 
part of an effective remedial scheme for eradicating intentional discrimination.120
However, this way of relating retaliation to discrimination, as a useful remedy to 
effectuate the protected right, also runs afoul of Sandoval:  the same could be said for the 
regulation covering disparate impact struck down in that case.  Because of the difficulty 
of proving intent, regulating practices that impose disproportionate harm on suspect 
classes without adequate justification could be justified as a necessary or at least useful 
remedy for addressing intentional discrimination that would otherwise go unchallenged.  
Indeed, this may be the best explanation for Griggs v. Duke Power,121 which held that 
Title VII’s ban on discrimination includes practices with a discriminatory effect and 
lacking in business necessity.122  While surely not every practice struck down as disparate 
118
  See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1508 (“Reporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX 
enforcement and would discouraged if retaliation against those who report went unpunished.  Indeed, if 
retaliation were not prohibited, Title IX’s enforcement scheme would unravel.”); id. (“Moreover, teachers 
and coaches such as Jackson are often in the best position to vindicate the rights of their students because 
they are better able to identify discrimination and bring it to the attention of administrators.  Indeed, 
sometimes adult employees are ‘the only effective adversaries’ of discrimination in schools.”) (quoting 
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969)).
119 See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (describing the retaliation right in remedial 
terms, and stating that the purpose of the retaliation claim is to maintain “unfettered access to statutory 
remedial mechanisms.”); Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1508 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, 
citing Congress’ twin purposes of avoiding federal subsidization of discrimination and providing 
individuals protection from discrimination, and stating that those objectives “would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve if persons who complain about sex discrimination did not have effective protectin 
against retaliation.”).
120
  Legal scholars have questioned whether there really is a meaningful distinction between rights and 
remedies, or whether remedial choices merge with, and modify, underlying rights.  See, e.g., Daryl J. 
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999); Paul Gewirtz, 
Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983).  Without intending to take a position on this larger 
question, the discussion here, analyzing the implications of Sandoval, assumes a separateness between 
remedy and right, largely because the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoval insists on such a distinction.  
See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 (rejecting the idea that “‘it is the duty of courts to be alert to provide such 
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose’ expressed by a statute”).
121
  401 U.S. 424 (1971).
122 See, e.g., Susan Strum, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:  A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 466-67 (2001) (“Disparate impact cases of the first generation type also derived their 
moral bite and legitimacy from the prior era of deliberate exclusion, although they never fit neatly in to the 
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impact serves as a remedy to unlawful intentional discrimination, by the same token, not 
every successful retaliation claim serves as a remedy for unlawful intentional 
discrimination.  As explained above, a successful retaliation claim may not necessarily 
stem from opposition to actual discrimination.  Moreover, like the disparate impact 
regulation in Sandoval, the retaliation regulation is not strictly necessary as a remedy for 
intentional discrimination.  Not all institutions retaliate and not every individual would be 
deterred from challenging unlawful discrimination even if they did.  Recognizing a 
private right of action for retaliation merely because it is a useful remedy to effectuate the 
ban on intentional discrimination cannot be reconciled with Sandoval’s emphatic refusal 
to infer that Congress meant to create a private right of action merely because doing so 
would create necessary and useful remedies for enforcing statutory rights.123  Perhaps this 
is why the Court in Jackson did not stand on the remedial rationale alone, and instead 
repeatedly and emphatically returned to its insistence that retaliation is itself a form of 
intentional discrimination on the basis of sex.124
3. The Promise of Jackson and the Possibilities for Further Theorizing
The Court’s most notable and promising effort to make room for retaliation within 
the rubric of intentional discrimination appears in its discussion of a further difficulty: the 
retaliation claimant may not be among the class of persons targeted by the alleged 
discrimination.  The Board of Education in Jackson had argued, with success in the 
Eleventh Circuit, that even if Title IX encompassed protection from retaliation, Mr. 
Jackson could not invoke it since he was outside the class of persons protected by the 
statute, persons discriminated against on the basis of sex.125  As was the case in Jackson, 
retaliation claims are often brought by persons who are not themselves the targets of the 
alleged discrimination, but who object to perceived discrimination on behalf of others.126
This complication poses an added difficulty for situating retaliation as a form of 
intentional discrimination.  Even if the retaliation against the target of discrimination 
counts as intentional discrimination, notwithstanding the difficulties discussed above, 
there is a further challenge in explaining how a third person, one not subjected to the 
underlying alleged discriminatory conduct, experiences discrimination on the basis of sex 
when he or she is punished for complaining of discrimination against someone else.  
dominant antidiscrimination paradigm.  Discriminatory application procedures and tests were problematic 
because they perpetuated patterns of past deliberate, systemic exclusion or reflected ongoing, though 
unstated, intentional exclusion.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, Faculty Working Papers 
Series, Paper No. 05-04-02, Apr. 12, 2005, at 52 & n.211 (explaining the appeal of disparate impact 
doctrine as a means of reaching employer practices which serve as a cover for intentional discrimination, 
and citing sources explaining disparate impact doctrine on this ground) (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=701265).
123
  See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87.
124 See supra note 108-110 and accompanying text.
125 Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 309 F.3d 1333, 1346 (11th Cir., Oct. 21, 2002), reversed, 
125 S.Ct. 1497 (2005).  
126 See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 577 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding high level 
affirmative action officer had a viable retaliation claim due to his advocacy on behalf of women and 
minorities); Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(upholding retaliation claim brought by university faculty member who alleged that he was fired after 
aiding a woman “who was trying to exercise her Title VII rights to retain her job”).
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One possible escape from this difficulty might be to recognize a form of third 
party standing in which the target of the retaliation is permitted to assert the 
nondiscrimination rights of others.  However, third party standing is not an adequate 
solution.  Although some courts have recognized broad third-party standing to challenge 
discrimination against other persons, these cases differ from retaliation claims in 
important respects.127  In the retaliation claim, the retaliation claimant bears the brunt of 
the retaliatory harm, and the injury is direct and palpable.  In Jackson, for example, the 
firing of the coach is more than an extension of any sex-based harm to the female 
students, who may or may not experience harm from the firing of their coach.128  As the 
social science literature discussed above demonstrates, persons who challenge inequality 
face very real and substantial costs for doing so.129  The problem is not one of standing, 
but of linking the retaliation back to the ban on intentional discrimination.  In the third-
party standing cases, on the other hand, the injury stems from the original discrimination 
and the doctrine of standing is stretched to allow someone else assert the injury on behalf 
of another.  Perhaps for this reason, the Court in Jackson did not rely on third party 
standing to support retaliation claims brought by persons who are not the targets of the 
underlying discrimination.130
Instead, in a tantalizing move that begins to reveal the lengths to which the 
Court’s decision stretches the boundaries of intentional discrimination, the Court 
suggested that “on the basis of sex” does not necessarily refer to the plaintiff’s own sex or 
require the status-based differential treatment of the individual plaintiff.  Distinguishing 
Title IX from Title VII, the Court noted that it might have reached a different result for 
retaliation claims brought by persons not themselves subjected to the underlying 
discrimination if the statute had stated that “no person shall be subjected to 
discrimination on the basis of such individual’s sex.”131  The Court’s shift to disentangle 
intentional discrimination from the status-based differential treatment of individuals 
holds great promise for resting retaliation claims on a more secure foundation in 
discrimination law, and for reshaping discrimination law itself.  However, the Court 
stopped short of the implications of this opening, resting on a minor linguistic difference 
that is weak and ultimately unpersuasive.  As Justice Thomas correctly noted in his 
dissent, the terms, “on the basis of sex,” “because of” sex and “because of such 
individual’s” sex have long been viewed as interchangeable.132  Moreover, cases brought 
under Title IX, no less than other nondiscrimination statutes, have required the plaintiff to 
prove that she herself was subjected to differential treatment based on her protected class 
127
  For a discussion of the third-party standing cases, see Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game:  
Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 83-91 (2002).
128
  It is possible, for example, that the students in a case like Jackson might dislike their coach and would 
not experience injury from the retaliation he experienced.  Although relational harms from retaliation 
probably exist in the vast majority of cases, given the likelihood of some affinity between the targets of 
discrimination and the persons who take up their cause, such relational harms should not serve as a proxy 
for the harm to the target of the retaliation.
129 See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
130
   125 S.Ct. at 1507 (explaining that “retaliation claims extend to those who oppose discrimination 
against others”); id. at 1505 & n.1 (refusing to limit Sullivan to a mere decision about standing and instead 
reading it to interpret “a general prohibition on racial discrimination to cover retaliation against those who 
advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition.”).
131
   125 S. Ct. at 1507 (emphasis in original).
132 Id. at 1511 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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status.133  The Court’s attempt to stem the broader implications of disentangling the ban 
on intentional discrimination from status-based differential treatment with the language 
of Title IX falls far short of a compelling rationale. In the end, the Court simply retreated 
to its emphatic assertion that the plaintiff in Jackson had indeed experienced 
discrimination on the basis of sex because he was punished for complaining about sex 
discrimination, without resolving the difficulties with this approach under existing 
discrimination law, as elaborated above.134
Neither the majority opinion in Jackson nor the lower court litigation over the 
private right of action controversy have fully engaged the complexity of situating 
retaliation as a form of intentional discrimination as currently framed.  The better 
approach is to recognize the malleability of intentional discrimination in legal discourse 
and to shift the boundaries of that category to make room for retaliation claims.  
Recognizing retaliation as a species of intentional discrimination has the potential to push 
the scope and boundaries of discrimination law in constructive directions and to bring the 
law closer to its animating ideals.  Rather than limiting discrimination to the class-based 
different treatment of individuals, discrimination law should be understood as aspiring to 
secure two related objectives:  (1) dismantling unjust systems of privilege by protecting 
outliers and challengers of the gender/racial order; and (2) furthering the democratic 
values of equal citizenship.  Retaliation implicates both of these values, and deserves 
protection under discrimination law on these grounds.  As importantly, recognizing 
retaliation as a species of discrimination promotes an understanding of discrimination law
consistent with these objectives.
B.  REFOCUSING ON PRIVILEGE AND THE RESISTANCE TO RACIST 
AND SEXIST NORMS
Situating retaliation as intentional discrimination requires stepping outside the 
framework of status-based differential treatment and into a broader conception of 
discrimination as the maintenance of race and gender privilege.  Retaliation, functioning 
as it does to maintain social hierarchies and punish outliers, fits well within such a 
framework.
The questions raised above concerning retaliation and its relationship to 
intentional discrimination revisit ongoing debates about the scope and meaning of the 
antidiscrimination principle.  One site in these debates is the contested space left by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hopkins v. Price-Waterhouse.135  In that case, the Court 
ruled that sex stereotyping is a form of sex discrimination, upholding Ann Hopkins’ 
claim that she was denied partnership in the accounting firm because she defied the 
firm’s expectations of how she should perform her femininity.  Writing for a plurality, 
Justice Brennan wrote, “[w]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
133 Id. at 1512 (citing Title IX cases).
134 Id. at 1507 (“Where the retaliation occurs because the complainant speaks out about sex 
discrimination, the ‘on the basis of sex’ requirement is satisfied.  The complainant is himself a victim of 
discriminatory retaliation, regardless of whether he was the subject of the original complaint.”).
135
  490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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group.”136  Although Justice Brennan’s language suggests little tolerance for sex 
stereotyping or gender role “policing” of any kind, the decision lends itself to competing 
interpretations, fueling the controversty over the scope of the antidiscrimination principle.  
One of the broader interpretations of this precedent is that gender privilege, and 
the punishment of persons who challenge the gender order, amounts to unlawful 
discrimination.  This view could potentially unsettle Title VII decisions upholding 
employer prerogatives to bar employees from dressing in ways that fail to conform to 
traditional gender roles, such as by firing men who wear earrings or requiring women, but 
not men, to wear skirts.137  It also calls into question rules punishing gay men and 
lesbians for defying sex role expectations through their attraction to persons of the same 
sex, disrupting case law drawing the boundaries of sex discrimination law to exclude 
sexual orientation bias.138  Increasingly, a number of recent court decisions have accepted 
this broad reading of Hopkins and have applied the antidiscrimination principle to weed 
out “gender role policing,” or the punishment of persons for transgressing gender 
privilege.139  Applied broadly, this principle has the potential to challenge systems of 
gender privilege that elevate traditional versions of masculinity and femininity above 
alternative nonconformist performances of gender identity.
136 Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251.
137 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting Title VII claim 
by female bartender challenging rule requiring female beverage servers to wear make-up); Frank v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (rejecting Title VII challenge by female flight 
attendants to gender-specific weight requirements); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th 
Cir. 1974) (upholding different hair-length and grooming requirements for men and women); Oiler v. Winn 
Dixie La., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417 (E.D. La. 2002) (rejecting male plaintiff’s Title VII alleging 
that he was fired for cross-dressing); but see Fischer v. Portland, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20453 (D. Or. 
2004) (upholding female plaintiff’s Title VII claim that she was harassed for being a lesbian who wore 
men’s clothes to work, work no make-up and wore a short hairstyle; plaintiff showed that she was harassed 
because she presented herself in a manner not fitting traditional gender stereotypes); Tronetti v. Healthnet 
Lakeshore Hosp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23757 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (upholding transsexual’s claim of sex 
discrimination that he was fired for “failing to act like a man”); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 26207 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (denying employer’s motion for summary judgment where male 
plaintiff was fired for cross-dressing and not conforming to masculine stereotypes).
138 See, e.g., DeSantis v. Happy Times Nursery School, Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (ruling sexual 
orientation discrimination outside the bounds of Title VII); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 
194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting plaintiff’s sex-based harassment claim where the harassment was 
based on sexual orientation rather than sex).
139 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (relying on Hopkins in support of 
decision reinstating sex discrimination claim by a transsexual firefighter who alleged harassment and 
retaliation because of his nonconforming gender identity as a male to female transsexual); Centola v. 
Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002) (rejecting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 
plaintiff’s claim that he was harassed for not measuring up to his coworkers’ stereotypes about 
masculinity); Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8521 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (accepting 
plaintiff’s gender stereotyping theory to support hostile environment claim for anti-gay harassment, but 
ultimately rejecting the claim for lack of severity or pervasiveness); Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn. 2000) (upholding plaintiff’s Title IX claim alleging anti-gay 
harassment because even though Title IX does not cover sexual orientation discrimination, plaintiff 
established that he was harassed for not meeting his peers’ expectations of masculinity); Nichols v. Azteca 
Restaurant Enterprises, 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding Title VII claim alleging anti-gay 
harassment on a gender stereotyping theory); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 
2002) (same).
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Numerous legal scholars have pressed the case for reconstructing discrimination 
law to dismantle systems of race and gender privilege.140  One leading theorist who has 
advocated such a shift, Professor Stephanie Wildman, defines privilege as “the systematic 
conferral of benefit and advantage,” usually referring to the unjust allocation of privilege 
along historically problematic lines such as race and gender.141  She advocates a 
reorientation of discrimination law to spotlight how power systems of race, gender and 
sexual orientation regenerate discriminatory patterns that maintain hierarchies of 
oppression.142  She is critical of narrow constructions of discrimination law focusing on 
differential treatment based on specific identity categories, and of the law’s complacency 
with respect to power systems that operate within and across such categories to sustain 
unjust privilege.  Professor Wildman argues that the language of discrimination law is 
sufficiently broad to encompass the disruption of systems of privilege, and criticizes 
courts that decline to take the doctrine in that direction.143
This broad conception of the antidiscrimination principle has not gone 
unchallenged.  A narrower view, and still the dominant view in the courts, is that the 
Court in Hopkins merely articulated a variant of the prevailing anti-differentiation 
principle.144  Under this interpretation, the problem in the case was that women, but not 
men, faced a Catch-22:  all employees had to exhibit “masculine” traits to succeed in the 
partnership, but only women were penalized for doing so.145  This interpretation would 
have a narrower scope and would not upset the kinds of practices described above.  An 
anti-differentiation principle would permit institutional practices that privilege traditional 
forms of masculinity and femininity so long as men and women have an equal 
140 See, e.g., BARBARA FLAGG, WAS BLIND BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW
17-18 (1998) (urging a reformulation of discrimination law that acknowledges and renounces white 
privilege);  Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 255, 275, (urging advocacy focused on interlocking systems of 
oppression); Symposium, Whiteness:  Some Critical Perspectives, 18 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y
(forthcoming 2005) [JUMP CITE/PARENTHETICAL].
141 STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED:  HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA
29 (1996).
142 Id. at 5, 28.
143 Id. at 29-33.
144 See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000) (granting defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment on plaintiff’s claim of anti-gay harassment by coworkers where there was “no basis in the record 
to surmise that [the plaintiff] behaved in a stereotypically feminine manner and that the harassment he 
endured was, in fact, based on his non-conformity with gender norms instead of his sexual orientation”); 
Martin v. N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. Serv., 224 F. Supp. 2d 434, 446-47 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s Title VII harassment claim where “[t]he torment endured by [the plaintiff], as reprehensible as it 
is, relates to his sexual orientation,” and he failed to show that “the harassment he endured was, in fact, 
based on his non-conformity with gender norms instead of his orientation.”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting Title VII harassment case where the harassment 
occurred because of sexual orientation and not sex); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 
2000) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim for anti-gay harassment where the unfavorable treatment was because of 
the plaintiff’s apparent homosexuality and “his perceived desire for some sort of physical intimacy with 
them, and not because of his sex); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(rejecting application of the Hopkins theory to a claim involving anti-gay harassment).
145
  Justice Brennan’s opinion also might be read to support this view, focusing on the “Catch 22” language 
instead of the broader anti-stereotyping language quoted above.  Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 288 (“An employer 
who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an 
intolerable and impermissible Catch 22:  out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do 
not.  Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”).
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opportunity to conform to their respective gender roles without incurring disparate 
penalties for doing so.
Debates over the scope and limits of discrimination law continue to percolate in a 
variety of doctrinal areas.  The meaning of any legal prohibition against discrimination is 
contested and unstable, vacillating between formal equality and anti-differentiation and a 
broader, more far-reaching understanding in which discrimination law functions as a 
vehicle for interrogating entrenched systems of race and gender privilege.  The 
recognition of retaliation as implicit in the nondiscrimination guarantee bolsters this latter 
understanding and is best seen as one more push to redefine discrimination to include 
punishing departures from a social order bounded by race and gender.
Recognizing retaliation as a species of discrimination helps construct 
discrimination law to encompass challenges to unjust privilege and to move beyond 
securing class-neutral treatment of individuals.  This understanding best captures what 
retaliation is about and why it is a form of intentional discrimination.  As the earlier 
discussion of social science literature illustrates, retaliation silences opposition to 
inequality and punishes persons for challenging racism and sexism.  By enforcing silence 
and acquiescence, retaliation protects privilege and sustains its invisibility.146  Opposition 
to discrimination has the potential to disrupt systems of privilege by rendering the 
privilege visible.  When retaliation intervenes to punish such opposition, it preserves 
privilege by punishing challenges to race and gender hierarchy.  By protecting persons 
who oppose inequality, discrimination law, through the retaliation claim, promotes the 
construction of anti-racist and anti-sexist identities and facilitates the destabilization of 
unjust systems of privilege.
Conceptualizing retaliation in this way offers a number of advantages for 
discrimination law.  At the outset, it shifts the focus from neutral, individualistic status-
based treatment to questions of illegitimate privilege and the importance of contesting 
inequality.147  The retaliation claim recognizes and protects the value of resisting 
inequality in particular social and institutional settings.  By protecting against retaliation, 
the claim focuses on the discourses that shape social equality, which discourses get 
protected, and why.  It conceives of discrimination as a social practice, rather than an 
abstract neutral principle of equal treatment.  The conception of discrimination that it 
rests upon is contingent, rather than static, and historically grounded.  
Equally important, this understanding of why discrimination law encompasses 
retaliation claims permits a more fluid conception of social identity than that offered by 
the anti-differentiation approach.  In a retaliation claim, it is not a person’s fixed status-
based identity that triggers legal protection, but rather her participation in a discourse that 
challenges inequality.148  By encompassing retaliation claims, discrimination law protects 
146 Cf. WILDMAN, supra note 141, at 8 (“silence in the face of privilege sustains its invisibility”); id. at 31 
(“perhaps most important, privilege is not visible to the holder of the privilege”); id. at 107 (explaining that 
privilege requires silence to secure its perpetuation).
147 Cf. Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory:  A Reply to Catharine 
MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217, 235 (1993) (describing privilege as “unearned power that is 
systematically conferred”).
148
  Of course, the challenger’s own racial or gender identity is not completely separate from the challenge 
to inequality and the resulting punishment.  Expectations about proper social roles are certainly shaped by 
racial, gender, sexuality, and other components of an individual’s identity.  See, e.g., Zatz, supra note 127, 
at 63, 108 (2002) (contending that punishing intergroup solidarity is a form of stereotyping in which 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
34
the subject’s identity-formation instead of taking a passive, pre-existing identity as the 
starting point.149  So understood, the retaliation claim is less vulnerable to the radical 
critique of equality rights that by requiring subjects to claim a fixed and stable social 
identity, such rights reinforce the very categories that enable systems of race and gender 
privilege to continue.150  Because the trigger for protection is the subject’s actions and not 
her status as a member of a social group, the retaliation claim creates the possibility of 
challenging inequality without further solidifying the categories of race or gender.151  The 
retaliation claimant need not establish that she was treated worse “as a woman,” but 
rather that she was penalized for challenging sexist practices, thus avoiding 
unintentionally reinforcing an essentialist view of what it means to be “a woman” in the 
course of asserting a sex equality right.152  By leaving more room for the complexity of 
the subject, the retaliation claim enhances the potential for the subject’s role in subverting 
the categories of race and gender.153  At the same time, the retaliation claim avoids one of 
the greatest pitfalls of postmodernism, the move to transcend the reality of social groups 
by exposing their fluidity.154  The retaliation claim does not seek to rise above or deny the 
reality of social groups; rather it protects discourses that challenge the rigidity and status 
hierarchies of social groups.155  With such a theoretical grounding, the retaliation claim is 
institutions monitor and regulate social interactions based on the target’s identity status).  But the retaliation 
claim does not depend on any particularized identity status of the target.  For example, both a white person 
and an African American who challenge racism risk punishment for not acting consistent with white 
privilege, and both would have a retaliation claim for the resulting retribution. 
149
  Seen in this light, discrimination law’s inclusion of the retaliation claim is an example of the potential 
for law’s acceptance of the theoretical turn to performative theories of identity.  See, e.g., Devon Carbado 
& Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 717 (2001) (explaining that 
discrimination targets people not just for their “status” but for how they “perform” their identity).  
Retaliation can be seen as the policing and punishment of anti-sexist and anti-racist identities, or the 
enforced suppression or “covering” of these identities.  See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 
(2002) (developing a theory of “covering” as an under-examined form of oppression).  By embracing the 
retaliation claim, discrimination law protects performances of identity that challenge the rigidity of status 
hierarchies.
150 See, e.g., Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 420-34 
(2002) (elaborating a critique of identity-based nondiscrimination rights).
151 Cf. Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV.
1045, 1075 (1992) (“Only when sex means more than male or female, only when the word ‘woman’ cannot 
be coherently understood, will oppression by sex be fatally undermined”); WILDMAN, supra note 141, at 22
(criticizing categorical thinking for obscuring the complexity of the individual).
152 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 150, at 422 (“To have a right as a woman is not to be free of being 
designated and subordinated by gender.  Rather, though it may entail some protection from the most 
immobilizing features of that designation, it reinscribes the designation as it protects us, and thus enables 
our further regulation through that designation.”)..
153 See generally Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2479 
(1994) (discussing the need for discrimination law to recognize the complexity of subjects in addressing 
their discrimination claims).
154 See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687, 695 
(2000) (criticizing postmodernist critiques of feminism for ignoring social reality); Christine A. Littleton, 
Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About Women?, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 22 (1991) (urging the 
importance of a continued focus on the situation of women as a social group); cf. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, 
at 255 (“It is crucial that we retain some method for talking meaningfully about groups, for preserving 
notions of identity.”).
155 Cf. NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE “POSTSOCIALIST” 
CONDITION 167 (1997) (“[W]e can accept the critique of essentialism without becoming postfeminists.”).
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well-positioned to prompt a rethinking of the regulation of social identities and how 
equality law can best disrupt systems of race and gender oppression.156
A related advantage to this theorizing of retaliation is that it acknowledges the 
oppressiveness of systems of subordination while simultaneously recognizing and 
protecting the agency of persons caught up in those systems.157  The retaliation claim 
focuses on the claimant’s choices and actions challenging inequality.  For this reason, it is 
less vulnerable to the criticism of antisubordination theories for emphasizing seamless 
structures of inequality that dominate passive victims.158  By providing space for persons 
to oppose inequality, discrimination law has the potential to expose the rifts and fissures 
in systems of dominance and make room for them to be contested, bringing 
discrimination law closer to realizing its emancipatory potential.159
Finally, this understanding of why discrimination law encompasses retaliation 
shifts the focus from the discriminator’s prejudicial intent to his or her actions in shutting 
down opposition to inequality.  Instead of an inquiry into the actor’s racist or sexist 
mindset, the analysis centers on the silencing of discourses that challenge how an 
institution practices race and gender privilege.  This formulation offers a conception of 
discrimination as premised not on the discriminator’s subjective mindset, but on the 
preservation of race or gender privilege and the suppression of challenges to them.
C.  ADDING CONTENT TO EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
In addition to challenging narrow constructions of discrimination law, recognizing 
retaliation as a form of discrimination promotes important values and aspirations 
underlying discrimination law, giving added weight to the reasons why we care about 
discrimination in the first place.  The retaliation claim furthers the democratic values at 
the foundation of law’s nondiscrimination guarantee.
One of the core values underlying discrimination law is the desire to facilitate a 
system of democratic governance based on an ideal of equal citizenship.  The value 
choices reflected in discrimination law cannot be understood without some appreciation 
of how they enhance democracy and the legitimacy of democratic outcomes.  One of the 
leading theories for explaining the moral force of discrimination law, the process theory 
advocated by John Hart Ely and others, justifies strictly scrutinizing legislative decisions 
156 Cf. id. at 166 (“Complex, shifting, discursively constructed social identities provide an alternative to 
reified, essentialist conceptions of gender identity, on the one hand, and to simple negations and dispersals 
of identity, on the other”); WILDMAN, supra note 141, at 29 (explaining that law entrenches privilege when 
it allows the punishment of those who refuse to acquiesce in privilege, and emphasizing that the choice of a 
privileged person in how to respond to privilege is not exercised independent of law).
157 See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE:  CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL 
RIGHTS AMERICA 111-14 (1999) (offering a “dynamic yet constrained view of group agency” in which 
subordinated groups are simultaneously constrained by subordinating systems and actively engaging in 
resistance against those systems).
158 See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 147, at 217 (criticizing the antisubordination approach for over-
emphasizing the victimization of women and adopting a view of gender oppression that centers on “what is 
done to women”); Harris, supra note 7, at 581, 612 (criticizing the antisubordinationists’ focus on female 
victimhood for being untrue to the experience of black women who have largely formed their identity 
through “creative action” rather than shared victimhood).
159
  I am loosely borrowing this phrase from Nancy Fraser, who has lauded “the emancipatory potential of 
oppositional practice.”  See FRASER, supra note 155, at 162.
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motivated by racism on the ground that such stigma poisons democratic outcomes by 
thwarting the legislature’s ability to act with due regard for the interests of all citizens.160
As Andrew Koppelman has explained, under this theory, racist preferences that target a 
discrete and insular minority are problematic because they undermine the very reason for 
respecting democratic outcomes in the first place.161  Our legal system’s respect for the 
outcomes of democratic processes is premised on an equal respect for people and their 
choices.  Certain preferences, such as those based on racism and sexism, are illegitimate 
because they deny the respect to persons as equal citizens that is at the foundation of 
democracy.162
This understanding of discrimination as poisoning the outcomes of the democratic 
process is not limited to discrimination by government actors.  Similar reasons justify the 
extension of statutory prohibitions on discrimination to certain non-governmental 
institutions, such as workplaces and schools.163  The extension of statutory discrimination 
law to private actors reflects the recognition that some non-governmental institutions also 
serve important functions in sustaining a democracy based on equal citizenship.  
Workplaces and schools, for example, play an especially important role, at least 
aspirationally, in constructing the norms and preferences necessary for the model of equal 
citizenship to succeed.  Racism and sexism within these institutions undermine their 
ability to foster the conditions necessary for equal citizenship.
The full extension of discrimination law to certain nongovernmental actors is 
particularly important and justified in light of the turn toward privatization of formerly 
public processes for resolving disputes within these institutions.  In recent years, legal 
standards have shifted to favor internal and less formal mechanisms for resolving 
discrimination complaints, especially in institutions such as workplaces and schools,  
prior to or instead of litigation and other government-controlled processes.164  These 
developments have made equal citizenship guarantees all the more essential within these 
institutions.  The public nature of such dispute resolution processes should not be 
obscured by the redirection of official responsibility into private hands.  Just as fair and 
unbiased treatment in the judicial process is critical to equal citizenship guarantees, so 
should the legally sanctioned use of internal grievance procedures be accountable to the 
demands of equal citizenship.
Discrimination law, as applied to both government actors and nongovernmental 
institutions, seeks to promote practices conducive to equal citizenship.  As Andrew 
160 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 145-57 (1980) (explaining the justification for 
strictly scrutinizing legislative classifications that disadvantage discrete and insular minorities based on a 
principle of equal concern and respect for all persons); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY at xii, 272 (1978); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term—Foreword:  In Defense of the 
Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976).
161 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY 38-39 (1996).
162 Id. at 39 (arguing that racist preferences must be excluded under both Ely’s and Dworkin’s theories 
because allowing racism to influence decision-making would contradict the very reasons for valuing a 
democratic decision-making process).
163 Id. at 14 (“Antidiscrimination law reaches private action because some private actors are held to the 
same obligation not to discriminate that government has (whatever that obligation may be).”).
164 See Sturm, supra note 4; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) 
(requiring prior notice to school officials followed by deliberate indifference to establish school liability for 
teacher-student sexual harassment); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (same for 
student-to-student harassment).
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Koppelman has explained, in order to fulfill the promise of equal citizenship, 
discrimination law must strive to eliminate the source of illegitimate preferences by 
eradicating racism and sexism in the broader culture and society, as well as within 
specific institutions.165  Only then can the legislative and policy outcomes of the 
democratic process be free of the taint of illegitimate discriminatory preferences.
This account of the democratic underpinnings of discrimination law, sketched so 
briefly here, leaves many unanswered questions about what it means to be an equal 
citizen and what practices promote the construction of equal citizenship.  The retaliation 
claim offers one set of answers to these questions.  By protecting persons who challenge 
racism and sexism, the retaliation claim furthers equal citizenship in two respects.  First, 
it promotes cultural transformation by protecting practices that challenge racism and 
sexism, thereby helping to eradicate the roots of the illegitimate preferences that taint 
democratic outcomes.  And second, it enables coalition-building and collective 
opposition to racism and sexism that cuts across social group membership.  In the 
process, it protects the construction of equal citizens who work together in the pursuit of 
social change and the social bonds that develop through such alliances.
1.  Fostering Cultural Transformation. If racism and sexism in the broader 
culture undermine equal citizenship and interfere with the proper functioning of 
democracy, then legal protection from retaliation is crucial to fulfilling the goals of 
discrimination law.  In a democracy based on equal citizenship, there must be sufficient 
room to contest racism and sexism in order to foster cultural transformation and eradicate 
the illegitimate preferences that undercut equal citizenship.  Retaliation silences 
complaints about inequality and cuts off the deliberation and dissent necessary for 
cultural transformation.  When it occurs within schools and workplaces, it weakens the 
capacity of these institutions to promote a fully functioning democracy.  A deliberative 
democracy based on equal citizenship requires space for people to contest the power 
hierarchies that can distort the ability of the less powerful to participate freely in 
deliberation.  Through the retaliation claim, discrimination law recognizes that contesting 
racism and sexism is a valuable form of civic participation and integral to the values 
underlying antidiscrimination law.166
The retaliation claim is particularly well-suited to serve the interests of cultural 
transformation because of its focus on persons who challenge institutional practices from 
within institutions.  Critiques by “insiders” provide an especially promising vehicle for 
165 KOPPELMAN, supra note 161, at 43-44 (arguing that since even unconscious racist preferences can 
affect the decision-making process, process theory requires cultural transformation to get rid of racist 
preferences in decision-making process); id. at 17 (“The aspirations of each theorist can only be realized in 
the context of a larger transformative project—one that seeks to eliminate from ordinary social life the 
meanings, practices, and institutions that unjustifiably stigmatize and disadvantage some groups.”).
166
  In elaborating the contours of democratic process justifications for discrimination law, Professor 
Koppelman draws on James Liebman’s work applying democratic theory to antidiscrimination law.  Id. at 
50.  As Professor Liebman’s work explains, the premise that all citizens must be accorded equal concern 
and respect assumes that citizens have an equal capacity to define “the good” for themselves.  Id.  Unlike 
Professor Ely’s theory, which seeks to free representatives’ decisionmaking from prejudice, Professor 
Liebman’s approach focuses on citizen participation in the political process.  Id.  The latter approach 
especially supports an understanding of discrimination law that provides strong protection for citizen 
resistance to racist and sexist norms.
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fostering cultural transformation within institutions.167  Challenges to race and sex bias 
made by persons outside the relevant community often generate added resistance by 
virtue of their outsider status, as exemplified by the heightened resistance to the civil 
rights movement based on the notion, however facetious, that the community was fine 
until outsiders swooped in to stir up trouble.168  Persons who are part of the relevant 
community are often in the best position to raise challenges to that community’s 
prevailing norms.  The value of promoting change from within is reflected in the policies 
of discrimination law that favor the voluntary resolution and prevention of discrimination 
claims.169  Protecting persons who challenge race and sex bias within institutions serves 
the same policy objective by promoting and enabling change from within.
The sweep of retaliation claims to include persons who are not members of the 
social group targeted by discrimination also furthers the goal of cultural transformation.  
Persons outside the class of the targets of discrimination are often better positioned to 
oppose discrimination because they are less likely to be perceived as overreacting or self-
interested.170  Hence it is essential that the retaliation claim protect all persons within 
167 See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY:  RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 40 (1970) (in discussing “exit” and “voice” as strategies for prompting 
organizational change, noting that voice plays an especially important role for organizational change when 
the person exercising voice is a member of the organization).
168
  For an example of a judicial opinion reflecting hostility to “outsiders” from the civil rights movement, 
see Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539, 541-43 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff’d, 313 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963), in which the district court praised the city segregationists and chastised “the 
self-styled freedom riders” who “aroused strained racial feelings” in challenging racial segregation in 
public facilities in Jackson, Mississippi.
169
  Numerous doctrines in discrimination law favor the prevention of discrimination and the voluntary 
resolution of discrimination claims without resort to formal legal proceedings.  See, e.g., Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (adopting an affirmative defense to vicarious liability for 
supervisory sexual harassment in which defendant may prevail by showing that it acted reasonably to 
prevent and address sexual harassment, such as by adopting a sexual harassment policy, and that plaintiff 
acted unreasonably in failing to prevent or correct the harassment, such as by failing to report it or invoke 
such a policy); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (same); Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (limiting school liability for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a 
student to cases in which school officials had actual notice of the harassment and responded with deliberate 
indifference); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (adopting same standard of 
school liability for student-to-student sexual harassment); Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 
2342, 2347 (2004) (holding that an employer may defend against constructive discharge, absent an official 
adverse action, by showing “(1) that it had installed a readily accessible and effective policy for reporting 
and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself 
of that employer-provided preventive or remedial apparatus”); Kolstad v. Ada, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) 
(barring punitive damages under Title VII where employer had made a good faith effort to prevent 
discrimination); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (describing “the primary 
objective” of Title VII as “a prophylactic one” in preventing discrimination).  Cf. Martin H. Malin, Ethical 
Concerns in Drafting Employment Arbitration Agreements After Circuit City and Green Tree, 41 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 779, 780-87 (discussing the case law favoring mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination 
disputes and the role of legal counsel for employers in constructing the arbitration process). 
170 See, e.g., FINE, supra note 46, at 71-72 (explaining research showing that “victims” who invoke 
procedures to address inequities that befall them are more likely to appear self-serving and less likely to 
gain the social support necessary to be effective, while “non-victims” who seek recourse on behalf of others 
are more likely to appear benevolent and to receive praise and rewards for doing so); Czopp &. Monteith, 
supra note 37, at 532, 534, 541 (explaining research showing that “when sources acted in support of their 
groups’ interest (i.e., their position confirmed group-based expectations), processing decreased among 
message recipients,” and concluding that “Blacks and women who confronted others were perceived as 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art23
39
institutions who challenge inequality, including persons who are outside of the social 
group that experiences the discrimination.
The retaliation claim is also well-suited to foster cultural transformation due to the 
nature of the institutions governed by it.  The institutions subject to the prohibition on 
retaliation are of special importance in the project of cultural transformation.  Schools 
and workplaces in particular play important roles in the construction of citizens.  Such 
institutions must allow space for contesting prevailing race and gender norms if 
discrimination law is to serve its democracy-enhancing objectives.  Few other settings are 
discrete and manageable enough to promote the kind of frequent human interaction 
necessary to engage in deliberative practices.  
The Supreme Court recognized the role schools play in promoting civic 
participation in Brown v. Board of Education.171  In explaining why racial segregation 
violated equal protection, the Court emphasized the important role of public schools in 
providing a foundation for good citizenship by teaching the values and skills necessary 
for a well-functioning democracy.172  More recently, the Court acclaimed the democracy-
enhancing role of universities in Grutter v. Bollinger,173 in terms that strongly suggest the 
importance of teaching civic virtue by promoting respect for persons across racial 
differences and the importance of diversity in interactions with others.  Both decisions 
craft interpretations of equality law based partly on the value of promoting the role of 
education in teaching anti-stereotyping, and by extension, good citizenship.
Workplaces too serve as important sites for civic participation and the 
construction of citizens.174  In today’s society, there is little opportunity, other than at 
work, for adults to hold sustained, in-person discussions and debates about social values 
with a relatively diverse group of fellow citizens.175  The workplace is a major site for the 
practice and construction of citizenship based on a model of equal respect.176  Because of 
overreacting to a greater extent than Whites and men even though both the initial biased response and the 
subsequent confrontation were exactly the same.”).
171
  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
172 Id. at 493 (“Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.  It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.  It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship.”).
173
  539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (stating that “[w]e have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance 
of preparing students for work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to ‘sustaining our political 
and cultural heritage’ with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society.  This Court has long 
recognized that ‘education . . . is the very foundation of good citizenship.’  For this reason, the diffusion of 
knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all 
individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.”) (citations omitted); id. at 333 (crediting the law school’s stated 
mission of “diminishing the force of . . . stereotypes” by admitting a critical mass of underrepresented 
minorities).
174 See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER:  HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A 
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2004) (making an excellent case for viewing the workplace as a central site of civic 
engagement in the democratic process).
175 Id. at 12-25, 61-62 (emphasizing the uniqueness of the workplace in today’s society in terms of 
connectedness with others, a high relative level of diversity in interactions with others, and norms favoring 
civility in order to work effectively with others).
176 Id. at 30 (discussing the workplace as a prominent site of teaching “civic skills”); id. at 118-22 
(explaining the importance of public discourse in democratic theory and why discourses at work “count” as 
this type of public deliberation).
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the centrality of these institutions to civic engagement, it is especially important that 
discrimination law protect persons who participate in discourses challenging racism and 
sexism in schools and workplaces.
Finally, and also in furtherance of the project of cultural transformation, the 
retaliation claim allows space for the construction of anti-racist and anti-sexist identities 
through the practice of opposition to racism and sexism.  It values and protects a form of 
citizenship that is active, participatory, and engaged in cultural transformation.  In this 
way, the retaliation claim protects the practice of equal citizenship.  The potential for 
cultural transformation is two-fold, derived both from resistance to the discrimination, 
with the chance that the resistance will change institutional practices, and from the 
construction of the challenger’s identity.  Even if the opposition does not ultimately result 
in changing the challenged practice, it may further the challenger’s own identity as 
someone who fights racism or sexism and cares about equality in a wider variety of 
settings—a citizen who practices equal citizenship and regards others as equals.  In this 
way, the retaliation claim protects the construction of equal citizens through the process 
of opposition to inequality.
2.  Collective Engagement and Social Bonds. By protecting against retaliation, 
discrimination law encourages the development of social bonds that transcend fixed 
identity categories.  The retaliation claim protects oppositional practice, as opposed to 
status-based identity, thus facilitating alliances and coalitions centered upon collective 
challenges to inequality.177  Protection from retaliation provides a necessary foundation 
for building social movements within institutions to contest racial and sexual hierarchy. 
By extending protection beyond the immediate targets of discrimination to include 
protection for any person who opposes it, discrimination law allows the mobilization of 
collective strategies for opposing inequality instead of seeing discrimination as only the 
problem of the targeted individual.178  In the process, it acknowledges the collective 
177
  Id. at 26 (discussing the connectedness and solidarity that comes from shared opposition to 
objectionable practices in the workplace).  Cf. Harris, supra note 7, at 581, 612 (advocating alliances 
between men and women who share a liberationist political vision, and recognizing how black women 
especially have constructed their identities in opposition to race and sex oppression in the pursuit of 
“creative action”); WILDMAN, supra note 141, at 5 (explaining the value in white people examining and 
challenging their own race privilege); Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 251, 319-20 (contending that “seeing 
identity groups as fluid, overlapping and constitutive entities, rather than as fixed and discrete, 
problematizes the notion of inter-group conflict and facilitates the recognition of commonalities.”).
178 Cf. SHIRLEY CASTELNUOVO & SHARON R. GUTHRIE, FEMINISM AND THE FEMALE BODY:  LIBERATING 
THE AMAZON WITHIN 3-6 (1998) (advocating feminist strategies that seek solutions in a cohesive, group 
setting, and arguing that only collective action can effectively challenge social norms); FINE, supra note 46, 
at 63 (criticizing mainstream social psychology literature for emphasizing individualist coping strategies, 
and arguing that individual responses to injustice often work best for persons in more privileged 
circumstances and may ultimately reinforce and justify existing power inequalities).  For this reason, the 
retaliation claim is better-suited to avoid the “reverse resistance” problem of subtly reinforcing the 
dominant discourse.  See CASTELNUOVO & GUTHRIE at 37.  Foucault has argued that “reverse resistance” 
discourse is just the flip side of the dominant discourse, which it ultimately reinforces.  Id. (explaining 
Foucault’s reverse resistance theory).  This theory posits that, for example, a lesbian who advocates gay 
and lesbian rights engages in reverse resistance by accepting heterosexual power discourse in which 
sexuality is categorized as normal or abnormal.  Id.  By defending herself as “normal,” she implicitly 
accepts the psychological, medical, and legal discourses that link sexuality and identity and define 
heterosexuality as “normal.”  Id.  Opposition to discrimination by non-targets is more likely to escape the 
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responsibility for addressing discrimination and refuses to marginalize sexism and racism 
as belonging exclusively to women and people of color.179  The social bonds that develop 
through collective opposition to racism and sexism promote a shared interest in the 
wellbeing of fellow citizens that is crucial to the equal citizenship model.180
For equal citizenship to be anything but aspirational, discrimination law must 
provide sufficient space for contesting racist and sexist norms that are inconsistent with 
equal citizenship.  By valuing and protecting a form of civic engagement that is actively 
involved in the opposition to inequality and that promotes coalition-building across social 
groups, the retaliation claim can play an important role in effectuating the democracy-
enhancing goals of discrimination law.181  In the process, it helps add content to the ideal 
of equal citizenship.
IV.  RECONSIDERING DOCTRINAL LIMITS ON RETALIATION
As with much discrimination law, the promise of the retaliation claim is 
threatened by the development of restrictive doctrine that undercuts its transformative 
potential.  Despite the potential of the retaliation claim to strengthen and further the 
antidiscrimination project, courts have imposed doctrinal limits that serve to legitimate 
inequality rather than interrogate it.  One of the most problematic limits is the 
requirement that the challenger had a reasonable belief that the challenged conduct 
amounted to unlawful discrimination.  Through this doctrine, courts have reinforced 
selective and narrow interpretations of discrimination, while labeling broader conceptions 
as unreasonable.  In the process, they have left challengers unprotected if their quest for 
equality goes beyond the narrowest and most minimal of nondiscrimination guarantees.
A.  THE REASONABLE BELIEF DOCTRINE 
To understand how the reasonable belief requirement thwarts the potential of 
retaliation claims, it is necessary to provide some background on the structure of 
retaliation claims under Title VII, the original source of the reasonable belief doctrine.  
Two key principles lay the groundwork for this discussion.
First, and as mentioned earlier, plaintiffs need not prove unlawful discrimination 
as a prerequisite for succeeding on a retaliation claim.182  Protection from retaliation 
reverse resistance problem because it destabilizes the boundaries of protected class status that distinguish 
victims from oppressors.
179 Cf. WILDMAN, supra note 141, at 16 (lamenting the ability of members of privileged groups to “opt 
out” of struggles against oppression, and noting that it is a privilege that can be exercised by silence); Faye 
Crosby, supra note 10, at 169, 175 (“A person’s sense of well-being depends not only on his or her 
personal situation but also on the situations of others in society.  Men’s health, for example, has been found 
to suffer when they work in environments that discriminate against women.”).
180
  See ESTLUND, supra note 174, at 83 (describing “the cultivation of interpersonal ties across racial lines” 
as a “public good” that enriches civic and social life by promoting a feeling of “being in this together” that 
is essential in a diverse democracy).
181 Cf. ESTLUND, supra note 174, at 103 (arguing that the success of democracy hinges on cooperation, 
empathy, and interdependence among different communities in society).
182
  For a sampling of cases explaining the rationale behind this rule, see Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale 
& Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1139 (5th Cir. 1981); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 
695 (9th Cir. 1978); Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980); Hearth v. 
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would mean little if it were otherwise.  Most people lack knowledge about whether what 
they perceive as discrimination is actually unlawful, and judicial outcomes in 
discrimination cases frequently depend on the identity of judges and jurors.  It would be 
highly risky to complain of discrimination if protection from subsequent retaliation 
depended on first proving unlawful discrimination.183  Moreover, certain discrimination 
claims require prior notice to succeed, leaving claimants in a Catch-22 if complaints of 
discrimination did not trigger protection from retaliation unless and until the underlying 
incidents gave rise to a claim of unlawful discrimination.184
A second established principle, also important for understanding Title VII’s 
reasonable belief doctrine in practice, is that protection from retaliation extends to 
participation in formal legal proceedings under Title VII as well as informal, internal 
challenges to perceived discrimination.  Two separate clauses in Title VII extend 
protection to persons who complain of discrimination depending on the form their 
challenge takes.  Employees who pursue the redress provided under the statute, such as 
filing or assisting with an EEOC complaint or a lawsuit, are protected by Title VII’s 
“participation clause,” which protects an employee from retaliation if he or she “has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].”185  A separate clause, known as “the opposition 
clause,” makes it “unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees 
. . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by [Title VII].”186  The opposition clause extends protection from retaliation to 
persons who complain informally of discrimination, stopping short of invoking the 
formal legal machinery of Title VII.187  Such protection is essential to support Title VII 
policies favoring the prevention of discrimination and the early, informal resolution of 
complaints.188  Charges of discrimination rarely reach the EEOC or the courts without 
Metropolitan Transit Commission, 436 F. Supp. 685 (D. Minn. 1977); Parker v. B & O RR Co., 652 F.2d 
1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981); EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975); 
Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2003).
183 See, e.g., Crumpacker v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 338 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(rejecting the state defendant’s argument that Congress overstepped its power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment when it created a retaliation action for opposing conduct that falls short of actual unlawful 
discrimination, and explaining:  “The determination of what constitutes prohibited conduct under Title VII 
continually evolves as ‘courts continue to struggle with the question of the types of workplace 
discrimination and harassment which are prohibited by Title VII.’”) (citations omitted).
184 See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (sexual harassment by a supervisor); 
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (sexual harassment of students by teachers); 
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (student-to-student sexual harassment); 
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004) (constructive discharge); Blankenship v. Parke 
Care Ctrs., 123 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 1997) (coworker sexual harassment).
185
  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
186 Id.
187
  There is some uncertainty as to which clause governs participation in an employer’s own investigation 
of discrimination charges.  The categorization largely turns on whether the employer’s investigation 
responds to or is independent of the filing of an EEOC charge.  See, e.g., Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 
176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title VII’s participation clause applies to participation 
in an employer’s internal investigation when it follows notice of an EEOC charge); EEOC v. Total Sys. 
Servs., Inc. 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000) (declining to extend participation clause protection to 
participation in employer internal investigations conducted prior to receiving notice of an EEOC charge).
188
  For early cases citing this rationale to justify protection from retaliation for challenging perceived 
discrimination under the opposition clause, see Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art23
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some higher-level person first learning of the complainant’s concerns.  Without 
protection from retaliation at the early, less formal stages of complaining, challengers 
would be chilled from ever complaining or be forced into formal legal action when 
informal action might have been a more appropriate response.189
As described so far, retaliation law accepts two important principles, both of 
which are fully consistent with the promise and objectives of the retaliation claim:  first, 
persons are protected from retaliation even if the conduct they challenge does not rise to 
the level of unlawful discrimination, and second, both formal and informal methods of 
complaining are protected.  The problem arises from an important qualification courts 
have imposed on these principles, one that substantially limits the ability of persons who 
complain informally of inequality to obtain protection from retaliation.  Courts require a 
closer proximity between the underlying conduct and the narrow universe of unlawful 
discrimination when the challenger raises her concerns informally as opposed to 
participating in formal Title VII proceedings.  When the challenge counts as 
“participation” in formal legal proceedings, the employee is protected regardless of the 
merits of the underlying assertion of unlawful discrimination.190  However, when the 
challenge occurs more informally, outside of an EEOC or judicial proceeding, the 
claimant must have a reasonable belief that the challenged conduct violated the statute.191
Because most people informally express their opposition to employer practices before 
resorting to legal action, the stricter standard imposed under the opposition clause turns 
out to be a critical gatekeeper.192  Furthermore, the trend toward privatization of 
1130, 1139 (5th Cir, 1980); Hearth v. Metropolitan Transit Commission, 436 F. Supp. 685 (D. Minn. 
1977); Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 1980).
189 See, e.g., Parker v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  For 
similar reasons, courts have also protected informal opposition under statutes that do not contain an express 
opposition clause.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Romeo Community Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(extending protection from retaliation under the Equal Pay Act to female custodian who informally 
protested gender-based wage discrimination); Davis v. Flexman, 109 F. Supp. 2d 776, 803 (S.D. Ohio 
1999) (interpreting § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to encompass protection from retaliation for informally 
complaining of discrimination against the disabled).
190 See, e.g., Glover v. S.C. Law Enf., 170 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999) (protecting plaintiff from retaliation 
under the participation clause even though plaintiff’s testimony was unreasonable); Clover v. Total Sys. 
Serv. Inc., 176 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that retaliation claims under the participation clause 
need not be premised on a reasonable belief in perceived discrimination).  To fail under the participation 
clause, the merits of the underlying complaint must go well beyond unreasonableness to the point of being 
false and malicious.  See, e.g., Johnson v. ITT Aerospace, 272 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2001) (the participation 
clause does not protect plaintiffs who file frivolous charges with the EEOC); Barnes v. Small, 840 F.2d 972 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (the participation clause does not protect employees from making false and malicious 
charges).
191 See, e.g., Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001); De Anda v. St. Joseph Hosp., 
671 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1982); Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. 
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1983).
192
  The problems with proceeding under the opposition clause are not solved by the ability to gain broader 
legal protection from retaliation by “participating” in formal Title VII proceedings.  The participation 
clause applies only to retaliation that occurs after the initiation of formal proceedings, and not to any 
retaliatory acts that occurred after the informal opposition to the practices but before the formal filing of a 
Title VII charge.  Moreover, there is some evidence that courts are beginning to import the objective 
reasonableness requirement to claims brought under the participation clause as well.  See Johnson v. Univ. 
of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 581 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding plaintiff’s participation clause claim where 
“[p]laintiff could have reasonably believed that he was engaging in a protected activity when he filed his 
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discrimination complaints, enforced by legal doctrines channeling complaints through 
internal and informal grievance procedures as a prerequisite to formal legal action, makes 
the reasonable belief doctrine all the more critical.193
The Supreme Court recently applied the reasonable belief standard to a retaliation 
claim under Title VII’s opposition clause in Clark County School District v. Breeden.194
In a per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that the plaintiff’s retaliation claim failed 
because she lacked a “reasonable belief” that the conduct she complained of rose to the 
level of unlawful discrimination.  The plaintiff in Breeden alleged that during a meeting 
she attended with a male supervisor and a male coworker, the two men engaged in 
sexually explicit dialogue.  Specifically, while reviewing psychological evaluation 
reports of job applicants, the supervisor read aloud a comment disclosing that one of the 
applicants had said to a coworker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the 
Grand Canyon.”  After reading the comment aloud, the supervisor looked at the plaintiff 
and said, “I don’t know what that means.”  The male coworker answered, “Well, I’ll tell 
you later,” and the two men chuckled.  The plaintiff complained about this exchange to 
the coworker and the supervisor who were in the meeting, to the coworker’s supervisor, 
and to an assistant superintendent who supervised the plaintiff.  She alleged that she was 
assigned less desirable job duties and relieved of her supervisory responsibilities in 
retaliation for her complaints.195  She subsequently filed a formal Title VII charge based 
on the same incident, after which she was transferred to a different job location.196  The 
claim for retaliation based on the change in job duties was governed by the opposition 
clause, while the change in job location fell under the participation clause.197
Applying the reasonable belief standard to the facts in Breeden, the Court quickly 
dismissed the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief that the above exchange amounted 
to unlawful sexual harassment.198  The Court did not question whether such sexual banter 
EEOC complaint.”); Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that it is 
improper to retaliate against an employee for filing a lawsuit based on a reasonable, good faith belief, as 
long as the claim is not “completely groundless”); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (stating that courts have not yet resolved whether the participation clause contains a “good faith, 
reasonable basis requirement”); Childress v. City of Richmond, 919 F. Supp. 216, 219 (E.D. Va. 1996) 
(rejecting white male officers’ participation clause claim where their charge of discrimination against 
women and African Americans amounted to a charge of “favorable treatment” for white males and was 
“spurious” under Title VII), aff’d, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998).
193 See EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc. 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the 
participation clause applies only to Title VII’s machinery,” such as “proceedings and activities” connected 
with a formal EEOC charge, but not to participation in the employer’s internal complaint mechanisms), 
reh’g en banc denied, 240 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Edward A. Marshall, Title VII’s 
Participation Clause and Circuit City Stores v. Adams Making the Foxes Guardians of the Chickens, 1 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 74-75 (2003) (stating that courts’ findings that the participation clause’s 
absolute retaliation protection is unavailable to employees who act “outside the ‘statutory machinery’ of 
Title VII or file complaints or testify in an employer’s own, internal grievance process[,] leaves employees 
forced into compulsory arbitration . . . without the protections from reprisal that have long been recognized 
as essential to effective enforcement of Title VII”).
194
  532 U.S. 268 (2001).
195
  See Breeden v. Clark County School Dist., No. 99-15522, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17564, at *2-*5 (9th 
Cir. July 19, 2000) (describing factual background of the dispute).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198
  The Court noted that it had “no occasion to rule on the propriety” of the reasonable belief standard 
“because even assuming it is correct, no one could reasonably believe that the incident recounted above 
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might, as part of a pattern of similar incidents, contribute to the creation of a hostile 
environment.199  Rather, the Court found this single incident insufficiently severe or 
pervasive to rise to the level of a hostile environment.200  Because the plaintiff lacked a 
reasonable belief that the offending conduct amounted to illegal sexual harassment, the 
retaliatory acts she experienced as a result of her informal complaints were not 
actionable.201
My concern with Breeden is not the Court’s analysis of whether the offending 
conversation amounted to sexual harassment.  The Court was surely right that a Title VII 
hostile environment claim based on these facts falls well short of what existing precedent 
requires.202  However, whether a person could have a reasonable belief that the incident 
created a hostile environment is a more complicated question.  On this issue, the court 
Title VII.”  532 U.S. at 270.  The Court’s decision forecloses a more lenient standard requiring only a 
subjective good faith belief, and raises a question as to whether the Court intended to suggest that plaintiffs 
must do more than show a reasonable, good faith belief that the underlying conduct violated Title VII.  
However, in light of the settled nature of this question in the lower courts, I find it unlikely that the Court 
would require more than this.  Cf. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1512 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Although this 
Court has never addressed the question, no Court of Appeals requires a complainant to show more than that 
he had a reasonable, good faith belief that discrimination occurred to prevail on a retaliation claim.”).
199
  The Court did not question, for example, whether the conduct occurred because of the plaintiff’s sex.  
See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“’The critical issue, Title VII's 
text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of 
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.’”) (citation omitted).  The closest the 
Court came to suggesting this as an issue was its cryptic statement that the plaintiff’s “coworkers who 
participated in the hiring process were subject to the same requirement [to review the sexually explicit 
statement in the course of the screening job applicants].”  Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271.  However, this 
reference alludes to the requirement of reading the comment in the file, to which the plaintiff did not object, 
as opposed to the discussion of the comment at the meetings.  With respect to the comment at the meeting, 
the Court viewed severity and pervasiveness, and not the because of sex requirement, as the real hurdle.  Id.
(concluding that the incident was “at worst an ‘isolated incident’ that cannot remotely be considered 
‘extremely serious,’ as our cases require”).
200 Id. at 270-71.
201
  The Court’s different treatment of the plaintiff’s participation clause claim demonstrates the greater 
difficulty plaintiffs have securing protection for informal opposition.  The participation clause claim 
alleged that the plaintiff was transferred to a different job location as punishment for filing a Title VII 
charge with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission and the EEOC and subsequently, a lawsuit, based on the 
same incident.  Id. at 271-72.  Because this claim fell under the participation clause, the “unreasonableness” 
of the plaintiff’s belief that the challenged conduct violated Title VII was not an obstacle.  Instead, the 
Court rejected this claim for lack of causation.  Id. at 272-74.  However, had the Court permitted the 
opposition claim to proceed, it is not clear that causation would have presented such a problem.  Causation 
failed on the participation claim because the supervisor who decided to transfer the plaintiff did not find out 
about the lawsuit before announcing that she was considering transferring the plaintiff, and because the 
notice of the EEOC charge was too remote in time, occurring nearly two years before the transfer.   Id. at 
273-74.  However, according to the Ninth Circuit’s more detailed description of the facts, the plaintiff’s 
internal complaints to supervisors preceded both the transfer decision and the change in supervisory 
responsibilities.  See Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17564 (July 10, 2000).  
Had the Court addressed the issue of causation under the opposition claim, it is not clear that it would have 
reached the same result.  The Court’s disposition of the participation claim shows that the possibility of 
asserting a claim under the participation clause for subsequent, formal complaints does not alleviate the 
hardship imposed by the opposition clause.
202
  See THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES:  USING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO 
REFORMULATE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 20-29 (2005) (summarizing case law granting summary 
judgment to employers for insufficient proof of severity and pervasiveness).
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below exhibited a more appropriate measure of caution, emphasizing the need to take into 
account “the limited knowledge possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs about the factual 
and legal bases of their claims.”203  The Ninth Circuit evaluated reasonableness from the 
perspective of a Title VII plaintiff.204  The Supreme Court’s cursory discussion of 
reasonableness obscured the question of perspective and implicitly adopted the Court’s 
own perspective, shaped by the limits of existing case law.
Since Breeden, courts have required plaintiffs bringing retaliation claims under 
the opposition clause to demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying 
conduct amounted to unlawful discrimination.205  Other courts have extended the 
reasonable belief requirement beyond Title VII to limit retaliation claims brought under 
other nondiscrimination laws as well.  For example, lower courts recognizing retaliation 
claims under Title IX and Title VI have applied the reasonable belief doctrine as a 
limitation on the protection afforded by such claims.206  They have done this despite the 
standard’s origin in Title VII’s unique statutory language, which parses “participation” 
and “opposition” into distinct clauses, and the absence of similar statutory language in 
Title IX and Title VI.  
The leading example of a court applying the reasonable belief standard to a non-
Title VII retaliation claim is Peters v. Jenney,207 the same case that broke from the 
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Jackson to recognize an implied private right of action under 
Title VI.  Although the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the 
retaliation claim under Title VI, the appellate court’s reasoning remanding the case made 
reasonable belief a critical and probably insurmountable hurdle for the plaintiff.  The 
plaintiff in Peters claimed that her objections to the selection criteria in the school’s 
gifted program, and her efforts to include more African American students in the 
program, triggered retaliatory action by the school district, resulting in her termination as 
director of the program.  The Fourth Circuit invoked a purportedly clear-cut distinction 
between intentional discrimination and disparate impact, explaining that the retaliation 
claim could succeed only if the conduct alleged by the plaintiff fell within the realm of 
intentional discrimination, as opposed to mere disparate impact.  The court emphasized 
that, regardless of the plaintiff’s subjective belief, it was not reasonable to believe that 
203 Breeden, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17564 at *4 (9th Cir. July 10, 2000).
204 Id. at *4 (explaining that “[t]he bar set by the ‘reasonable belief’ standard . . . is very low.”).
205 See, e.g., Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000); Little v. United 
Techs. Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997).  The Tenth Circuit was the last holdout in 
adopting a reasonable belief requirement.  Compare Shinwari v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 2000 WL 731782, 
at **5-6 (10th Cir. June 8, 2000) (“opposition activity is protected when it is based on a mistaken good 
faith belief that Title VII has been violated”) with Crumpacker v. Kansas, 338 F.3d 1163, 1171 (10th Cir. 
2003) (overturning the subjective good faith standard in light of Breeden).  If the objective reasonable 
belief standard is met, the subjective good faith requirement will rarely be an obstacle.  But see Montiero v. 
Poole Silver Co., 615 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1980) (affirming district court’s dismissal of retaliation claim for 
lack of a good faith belief that the challenged practices amounted to unlawful discrimination based on its 
finding that it was “at least as likely” that the plaintiff’s accusations were motivated by self-protection).
206 See, e.g., Howell v. North Central College, 331 F. Supp.2d 660, 663-66 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (applying 
reasonable belief requirement to Title IX retaliation claim); Nelson v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 923 F. Supp. 275, 
284 (same); Belgrave v. City of New York, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13622 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying same 
standards for Title VI retaliation claim as would apply under Title VII); Preston v. New River Community 
College, 31 F.3d 203, 206-07 (4th Cir. 1994) (same for Title IX).  Cf. Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & 
Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying reasonable belief requirement to ADA retaliation claim).
207
  327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003).
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Title VI encompasses disparate impact discrimination.  The plaintiff’s ability to succeed 
on remand ultimately turns on whether the selection policies she opposed amounted to 
intentional discrimination or merely had a disparate impact on African American 
students.  Although the court acknowledged that the plaintiff did not have to prove that 
intentional discrimination had actually occurred, it required her to show at a minimum 
that the practices she opposed raised a jury question as to whether the district had 
engaged in intentional discrimination.208
Against this backdrop, the Jackson decision was silent on the question of what 
standard governs retaliation claims under Title IX.  The majority opinion repeatedly tied 
its protection from retaliation to instances where, as the majority ambiguously phrased it, 
the plaintiff had complained of or about sex discrimination.209  The Court offered no 
guidance in distinguishing which complaints are “about sex discrimination” and which 
are not.  Notably, the majority did not require Mr. Jackson to demonstrate that the school 
had in fact discriminated against his female basketball players as a prerequisite for his 
claim to go forward, and it is not clear from the Court’s description of the facts that sex 
discrimination had indeed occurred.210  Also of note, the majority did not disagree with 
Justice Thomas’ accurate statement that existing law does not require retaliation 
claimants to prove that their underlying discrimination complaints were meritorious.211
However, the majority also opted not to respond to Justice Thomas’ explicit assumption 
that the same reasonable belief standard that governs retaliation claims under Title VII’s 
opposition clause would also apply to retaliation claims under Title IX.212  For now, at 
least, the applicability of the reasonable belief standard under Title IX, and by extension 
Title VI, is an open question.  Nevertheless, as evidenced by the Peters case, lower courts 
have already assumed its applicability and, judging from Justice Thomas’ dissent, the 
majority opinion in Jackson is unlikely to prompt a change in that assumption.  
208 Peters suggests that the reasonable belief standard merges into a determination of whether the 
plaintiff’s challenge to the underlying conduct could survive summary judgment in a discrimination claim.  
This standard, equating reasonable belief to the threshold for surviving summary judgment, is exceedingly 
harsh in light of the high rate of summary judgment in discrimination cases. Other circuits have been 
careful to clarify, despite their own strict interpretations of reasonable belief, that the standard does not 
necessarily require proof sufficient to survive summary judgment.  See, e.g., Wimmer v. Suffolk County 
Police Dept., 176 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) (“a plaintiff may state a prima facie case for retaliation even 
when her primary claim for discrimination is insufficient to survive summary judgment.”).
209
  See 125 S. Ct. at 1504 (“Retaliation against a person because that person has complained of sex 
discrimination…” is encompassed by Title IX); id. at 1507 (extending protection from retaliation to “a 
persons who speaks out against sex discrimination”); id. (“because the complainant speaks out about sex 
discrimination, the ‘on the basis of sex’ requirement is satisfied”).
210 See, e.g., Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U. 
Mich. J. L. Ref. 13, 123-25 (2000-2001) (explaining that the standard of Title IX compliance for equal 
treatment of men’s and women’s sports requires an overall program comparison, not a sport-by- sport 
comparison, and that equal funding is not necessarily required by Title IX, nor is parity of treatment for 
individual men’s and women’s sports).
211
  125 S. Ct. at 1512 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
212 Id. (“Although this Court has never addressed the question, no Court of Appeals requires a complainant 
to show more than that he had a reasonable, good faith belief that discrimination occurred to prevail on a 
retaliation claim.”); id. at 1513 (“For example, if a coach complains to school officials about the 
dismantling of the men’s swimming team, which he honestly and reasonably, but incorrectly, believes is 
occurring because of the sex of the team, and he is fired, he may prevail.).
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Consequently, the reasonable belief standard has the potential to shape the scope and 
extent of protection from retaliation well beyond Title VII.
B.  HOW COURTS USE REASONABLE BELIEF TO REINFORCE NARROW 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION AND LEGITIMATE INEQUALITY
The reasonable belief requirement has generated a highly problematic body of 
case law.  The following discussion offers four critiques of how this doctrine thwarts the 
promise of retaliation claims.  First, the reasonable belief doctrine masks the complexity 
of discrimination and squeezes out broader, competing understandings.  Second, it misses 
the interconnectedness of different types of subordination and too finely parses the 
categorical bases of discrimination.  Third, it obscures the interrelated harms to persons 
exposed to discrimination within institutions and enforces an artificial line between 
“victims” and “nonvictims.”  And finally, it imposes a court-centric and privileged 
perspective that is concealed by the neutral language of “reasonableness.”  The end result 
is that the reasonable belief doctrine blunts the potential of retaliation claims to more 
closely realize the progressive possibilities of discrimination law and secure its moorings 
in democratic values.
1. Masking the Complexity of Discrimination
Breeden itself foreshadows the first problem, that the reasonable belief standard 
obscures the complexity of discrimination and suppresses competing understandings.  
Although the Court correctly gauged the long distance between the sexual banter in 
Breeden and the discrete universe of unlawful sexual harassment under existing case law, 
it vastly understated the slipperiness of sexual harassment as a legal construct.  The Court 
implicitly assumed a stability and simplicity of sexual harassment law that does not exist 
in the real world of social and legal conflict.  Notwithstanding the Court’s prior insistence 
that questions of harassment can be answered by resorting to “common sense,”213
applying sexual harassment law to particular factual scenarios involves a great deal of 
uncertainty, even for persons who study this area of law.214  For employees who do not 
specialize in sexual harassment law, the main source of knowledge about what constitutes 
harassment is likely to come from their interpretation of cultural norms regulating sexual 
conduct in the workplace, perhaps supplemented by information provided by the 
employer.  Many employee handbooks, including the one allegedly read by the plaintiff 
in Breeden, include cryptic examples of behaviors such as joking, teasing and staring that 
closely resemble the incident that triggered the plaintiff’s opposition in Breeden.215
213
  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
214 See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide:  The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable 
People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 CAL. L. REV. 791 (2002) (discussing the gap between what 
judges and reasonable people recognize as sexually harassing); Donna Shestowsky, Note, Where is the 
Common Knowledge? Empirical Support for Requiring Expert Testimony in Sexual Harassment Trials, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999) (“[E]mpirical evidence finding men and women have vastly different 
perceptions of sexual harassment indicates that a common knowledge base for determining reasonable 
behavior does not exist.”).
215
  See Breeden, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17564 at *4-5 (9th Cir. July 10, 2000) (noting, in support of the 
reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief, that she had consulted the school district’s regulations, which “state 
that sexual harassment includes uninvited sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, and questions”); see also Vicki 
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2095-96 (2003) (discussing trend toward employer 
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Although the plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim in Breeden was indeed highly likely to 
fail when tested in court, by disparaging the “reasonableness” of the plaintiff’s view to 
the contrary, the Court abruptly halted a possibly productive conversation about what 
types of sexually offensive behaviors should be regulated for their potential to create a 
hostile environment, and greatly overstated the clarity of the line demarcating actionable 
sexually-tinged exchanges.
An added and related problem with the application of the reasonable belief 
standard in Breeden is the slipperiness of the threshold of harm required in a hostile 
environment sexual harassment claim.  The Court’s ruling in Breeden might have been 
less problematic had it concluded that the alleged incident did not come reasonably close 
to qualifying as the type of sexually harassing behavior that underlies a hostile 
environment claim.216  Instead, the Court ruled that, assuming the incident qualified as 
unwelcome conduct that harmed the plaintiff because of her sex, not enough of it 
occurred for a reasonable person to believe that it met the severity and pervasiveness 
threshold for creating a hostile environment.217  Other courts have followed Breeden to 
block retaliation claims when the underlying harassment was not sufficiently pervasive to 
support a reasonable belief that it was actionable.218  Under this rationale, an employee 
risks legally permissible retaliation if she complains of sexually harassing conduct too 
soon, before it becomes pervasive enough to support a reasonable belief that it amounts 
to a hostile environment.  The double-bind created by this standard is obvious: if the 
employee waits too long to complain, she risks losing a potential harassment claim for 
not having done enough to demonstrate that the harassment was unwelcome and for 
failing to meet an affirmative defense if her failure to complain sooner was 
“unreasonable.”219  In addition, certain harassment claims require persons to complain 
internally as a prerequisite for institutional liability, thus putting them in a risky position 
unless accorded full protection from retaliation.220
policies broadly defining sexual harassment and listing examples of harassing conduct, including sexual 
jokes and remarks).
216
  For example, it is not obvious why the offending comment disadvantaged the plaintiff on the basis of 
her sex.  See, e.g., BEINER, supra note 202, at 106-09 (discussing problems courts have viewing harassing 
behavior as “because of sex” when it permeates the environment instead of targeting members of one sex 
exclusively).  However, even here, one could elaborate reasonable theories for meeting this requirement, 
including that the comment is an oblique reference to female anatomy that degrades women’s sexuality and 
undermines their competence at work.
217
 Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001)
218 See, e.g., Holmes v. The Long Island Railroad Co., No. 96 CV 6196 (NG), 2001 WL 797951, at *6 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting railroad worker’s retaliation claim on the grounds that her allegations that the 
railroad’s physical therapist, whom she was required to see, made sexual comments about her body on 
three separate occasions and ordered her to disrobe when she believed such an examination was not 
necessary were too isolated in nature to support a reasonable belief that the incidents amounted to a hostile 
environment); Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding opposition to a single racially 
offensive remark by a co-worker was not protected).
219 Cf. Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (admonishing that a woman need not wait until 
she suffers a nervous breakdown before she has a viable hostile environment claim).
220 See, e.g., Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., 123 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 1997) (requiring notice for employer 
liability for coworker sexual harassment).  For an example of the double-bind created by requiring 
employees to give notice of the harassment to establish liability and yet withholding protection from 
retaliation when they do, see, Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
employee’s opposition to harassing remark by coworker was not protected where the remark could not be 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
50
As applied in Breeden, the reasonable belief standard obscures the oceans of 
uncertainty surrounding the precise point at which sexually offensive behavior crosses 
the line from merely offensive and annoying to become sufficiently pervasive to create a 
hostile environment.  The problem is not just that most people do not have sufficient legal 
expertise to ascertain where that line begins and ends, but that such a determination is 
truly unknowable in advance, dependent as it is upon the uncertainties of litigation.221
If Breeden were the only instance of the reasonable belief standard imposing 
orthodoxy among competing conceptions of discrimination, we might reserve judgment 
about whether the standard is well-suited to police the limits of retaliation claims.  The 
incident in Breeden is, after all, far removed from the kinds of extreme fact patterns that 
frequently surface in sexual harassment cases.  Unfortunately, however, lower court 
decisions abound with examples of the reasonable belief standard silencing important 
conversations about the scope and limits of discrimination law.
A more troubling example of how courts use the reasonable belief standard to 
enforce a narrow understanding of discrimination and silence alternative perspectives 
comes from the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Peters.  The Fourth Circuit found it per se
unreasonable to believe that practices with a disparate impact violate Title VI, which is 
limited to intentional discrimination.222  The court’s ruling implicitly assumed that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Sandoval corners the market on reasonable interpretations of 
Title VI.223  The court’s contention that other perspectives are unreasonable belies the 
reality that lay persons, unfamiliar with Sandoval, might well believe, quite reasonably, 
that unnecessary practices with the effect of excluding disproportionately African 
American students could and should violate Title VI.  Academic commentary on 
Sandoval reveals alternative interpretations of Title VI that are far from unreasonable.224
The court’s assumption of a bright-line rule between impact and intent obscures the 
fuzziness of this line, both in theory and in practice, as indicated by early judicial 
attributed to the employer, and it was not objectively reasonable to believe that the remark in itself violated 
Title VII).  For a case taking a more lenient—and reasonable—approach, see Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n 
Inc., 41 F.3d 524-27 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruling district court’s rejection of plaintiff’s retaliation claim 
where the plaintiff had opposed sexually offensive comments made by an outside consultant because the 
sexually offensive remarks occurred at a mandatory seminar, such that the plaintiff “certainly would be 
justified in believing that Title VII would protect her from the offensive remarks she endured while 
attending the meeting.”).
221 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV.
555 (2001) (discussing the difficulty plaintiffs face in winning employment discrimination cases and the 
biases that affect judicial decisionmaking).
222
  327 F.3d at 319-21.
223
  The court framed “the correct inquiry” as “whether the practices which Peters opposed constituted 
intentional discrimination forbidden by” Title VI.  Id. at 319.
224
  For a sampling of academic commentary criticizing Sandoval, see Note, After Sandoval: Judicial 
Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774, 1781 
(2003); Bradford C. Mank, Are Title VI’s Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 
519-20 (2002); David J. Galalis, Note, Environmental Justice and Title VI in the Wake of Alexander v. 
Sandoval:  Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron, 31 B.C. ENVT’L AFF. L. REV. 61, 
92-101 (2004).  See also Mank, supra note 77, at 47, 73 (noting that “[e]very federal court of appeals that 
addressed [the] question before Sandoval concluded that private plaintiffs may bring a private right of 
action to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations”).
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acknowledgements that proof of impact is often the best, and sometimes the only, 
evidence of discriminatory intent.225
The category of “intentional discrimination” is not sufficiently coherent to serve 
as the dividing line between reasonable and unreasonable interpretations of a legal ban on 
discrimination.  Legal scholars have puzzled for decades over the meaning and 
legitimacy of the construct of intentional discrimination and have reached widely varying 
conclusions.226 By labeling alternative and more far-reaching conceptions of 
discrimination “unreasonable,” the court in Peters called for an abrupt halt to critical 
discourses challenging dominant constructions of equality, on pain of retaliation without 
legal recourse.227  The court also obscured its own role in jealously guarding the 
knowledge it takes to form a “reasonable” belief, failing to acknowledge that the contrary 
understanding is only “unreasonable” if one knows of and accepts the exclusive 
legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sandoval.
Another example of how the reasonable belief standard bolsters narrow and 
orthodox understandings of discrimination while silencing competing perspectives comes 
from a case in the Second Circuit, Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty & Development 
Corporation.228  In this case, the plaintiff, a female secretary, alleged that she was fired in 
retaliation for complaining about gender stereotyping in the assignment of secretarial 
duties, which included attending to her boss’s personal matters during work hours.229
The Second Circuit upheld the dismissal of her retaliation claim on the ground that such a 
theory of sex discrimination was unreasonable because there were no male secretaries in 
the firm to use as comparators and no evidence that the plaintiff was given such 
225 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253-53 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that, 
“[f]requently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened 
rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor,” and suggesting that “the line 
between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as 
critical, as the reader of the Court’s opinion might assume”).
226
  For a small sampling of such scholarship, see David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming 
of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content 
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme 
Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. 
L. REV. 1105 (1987).
227
  In Peters, the Fourth Circuit not only rejected an impact standard as unreasonable, but also adopted a 
particularly narrow and strict version of the intent requirement, while labeling alternative approaches to 
intent unreasonable.  Peters, 327 F.3d at 321 n.18 (“While proof of a disparate impact, in combination with 
other ‘circumstantial and direct evidence of intent,’ can sometimes support an inference of intentional 
discrimination, a jury issue on intentional discrimination is not created ipso facto by pointing to a policy’s 
disparate effects. . . .  Deliberate indifference to a policy’s disparate impacts, as opposed to the purposeful 
pursuit of those impacts, is not a viable theory under Title VI.”) (citations omitted).
228
  136 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 1998).
229 Id. at 280-83.  The plaintiff claimed that she was overworked, given demeaning tasks, and required to 
assist her supervisor with personal matters.  She alleged both gender and age discrimination, claiming that 
her work assignments were “a result of being held to a sexual stereotype of what a female is in our society 
and in our workplace,” and that her supervisor “had a view of women that led him to overlook performance 
flaws in ‘young attractive female[s],’ which led to increased burdens for the ‘older less attractive 
plaintiff.’”  Id. at 281-82.
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assignments because she was female.230  The court rejected a broader interpretation of 
Title VII that would encompass the assignment of sex-stereotyped duties to persons in 
female-dominated jobs and the devaluation of traditional women’s work, ruling that Title 
VII does not prohibit supervisors from giving secretaries “female-gendered” work or 
requiring them to assist with personal matters.231  The court’s adoption of the narrower 
differential-treatment perspective and its labeling of the plaintiff’s alternative 
interpretation as unreasonable is particularly noteworthy given that a jury had found in 
favor of the plaintiff on her sex discrimination claim, presumably finding her theory of 
discrimination sufficiently reasonable to support its verdict.232  The court’s application of 
the reasonable belief standard in this case illustrates how courts use this requirement to 
falsely and artificially simplify the boundaries of discrimination law by enforcing a  
narrow and exclusive conception of discrimination.233
230 Id. at 291.  The court also faulted the plaintiff for not being clearer with her employer in specifying the 
basis of her complaint as gender discrimination.  Id. at 292.  I limit my critique of this case to its 
application of the reasonable belief standard, but observe as an aside that this requirement can also impose 
a hefty burden on plaintiffs to carefully articulate the basis of their opposition.  Id. at 288 (“[I]t was also 
insufficient to show that [the employer] could reasonably have understood that [the plaintiff’s] complaints 
about having to do extra work because of the conduct of her two female co-workers, about having to locate 
Headley for the numerous calls from his girlfriend, and about having to do work on Simon’s personal 
matters, actually constituted complaints that she was being discriminated against on the basis of gender.”).
231
  The court explained its rejection of the plaintiff’s challenge to sex-stereotyping in job duties as follows:
. . . the tasks whose nature [plaintiff] argued showed sexual stereotyping were tasks of a 
kind typically done for an executive by his or her secretary, whether the secretary is 
female or male.  It may be that historically, in most firms, most secretaries have been 
women.  But proof that an employer has assigned to a secretary tasks that are traditionally 
secretarial tasks—even if related to the employer’s personal business—does not suffice to 
support a verdict of gender discrimination. . . .
Id. at 290.  The court then addressed plaintiff’s argument that she was treated worse than attractive younger 
secretaries in the office who willingly performed female-gendered duties:
We know of no provision of Title VII, nor any regulation or case construing that statute, 
that imposes liability on an employer for preferring an employee who chose to “make [an 
executive’s] life more pleasant in the workplace, even if it was something as simple as 
bringing him coffee.”  
Id. at 291.
232
  The jury awarded the plaintiff $12,500 in compensatory damages and $87,500 in punitive damages, for 
a total of $100,000, on her sex discrimination claim.  Id. at 284.  For academic commentary supporting the 
reasonableness of a theory of discrimination similar to that pressed by the plaintiff, see Martha Chamallas, 
Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
747, 772-77 (2001)  (discussing the devaluation of activities associated with women as a form of gender 
bias).
233
  For a sampling of other court decisions vulnerable to this critique, see Holden v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 793 
F.2d 745, 748-49 (6th Cir. 1986) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that she was retaliated against for aggressively 
implementing an affirmative action plan because Title VII does not require companies to implement any 
affirmative action plan, must less an aggressive one); Miller Calabrese v. Continental Grain Co., 1997 WL 
392340, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (same).  These courts’ acceptance of the position that it is unreasonable to 
interpret Title VII to require affirmative action belies credible and reasonable arguments by legal scholars 
that press the boundaries between discrimination and the failure to implement affirmative action.  See, e.g., 
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2. Ignoring the Interconnectedness Between Different Types of Subordination
A second and related criticism is that courts use the reasonable belief doctrine to 
oversimplify the categorical distinctions separating protected and unprotected classes, 
thereby ignoring and obfuscating the intersectionality and interdependence of systems of 
subordination.  For example, the reasonable belief standard has been applied to impose 
orthodoxy in the controversy over the line separating sex from sexual orientation as a 
basis for discrimination.  
In a case respresentative of this genre, Hamner v. St. Vincent, the Seventh Circuit 
applied such a distinction to reject a retaliation claim brought by a male nurse who 
claimed that he was terminated for complaining of harassment based on his sexual 
orientation.234  The court concluded that because Title VII does not prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination, the plaintiff’s sincere belief that there was no difference 
between harassment based on sex and sexual orientation was not “objectively 
reasonable.”235  The court flippantly dismissed the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief 
in the interrelationship of sexual orientation and gender harassment.236 In doing so, it 
ignored a wealth of legal scholarship deconstructing such distinctions and marginalized a 
growing number of court decisions that have begun to carve out room for recognizing 
sexual orientation harassment as a species of gender stereotyping prohibited by Title 
VII.237  Other courts have similarly asserted crisp distinctions between sex and sexual 
orientation bias to reject retaliation claims for lack of a reasonable belief that a ban on sex 
discrimination encompasses sexual orientation bias.238  Through the vehicle of the 
David Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 105-06 (arguing that the principle of 
nondiscrimination may in some circumstances require affirmative action).
234
  Hamner v. St. Vincent, 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2001). 
235 Id. at 707.  
236
  The court briefly hinted at the possibility of greater complexity in the law’s separation of sex and sexual 
orientation, acknowledging that “the record may have supported Hamner’s reasonable belief claim if the 
record demonstrated that [the supervisor] disapproved of men in the nursing profession, and manifested his 
disapproval by perceiving all male nurses to be homosexuals, and harassed them accordingly, while female 
nurses were not subjected to such harassment.”  Hamner, 224 F.3d at 707 n.5.  The court also 
acknowledged the argument, which it viewed as waived, that the “harassment was based on sex because 
[the harasser’s] gestures (lisping and flipping his wrists) were specifically intimidating to men and their 
manhood. . .”  Id. at 707.  But no sooner did the court open a window to the possibility that the line 
dividing sexual orientation discrimination from sex discrimination might be less than crisp than it abruptly 
slammed it in conclusory fashion.  Id. at 707-08 (stating that, “this argument has no merit” because “the 
conduct that he opposed (harassment because of his sexual orientation) is not, under any circumstances, 
proscribed by Title VII”).
237
  For court decisions that begin to break down a strict dichotomy of sex-based and sexual orientation-
based discrimination, see the cases cited supra note 112.  For a sampling of legal scholarship questioning 
the coherence of the boundary separating sex from sexual orientation as a basis for discrimination, see
Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 197 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
187; Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” 
“Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995);
Brake, supra note 102, at 37. Cf. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 280-316 (detailing the mechanisms by which 
systems of subordination are mutually reinforcing).
238 See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Title 
VII retaliation claim because it was not reasonable for male employee to believe that Title VII covered 
sexual orientation discrimination); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic, 194 F.3d 252, 262 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for 
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reasonable belief doctrine, these courts seek to silence  ongoing conversations about the 
meaning and scope of sex equality law, while solidifying a dominant perspective that 
furthers both male privilege and heterosexual privilege.239
3. Enforcing Artificial Lines Between Victims and Nonvictims Within Institutions
A third and related problem with the reasonable belief doctrine is that it has 
functioned to enforce an artificial divide between persons at different levels and 
groupings within an organization, strictly separating those who are protected from those 
who are not.  A number of the cases exemplifying this problem involve teachers and 
other professionals speaking out against perceived bias and discrimination toward 
students or other persons in the communities they serve.  In one such case, Hill v. 
Chicago Board of Education,240 the court dismissed a school teacher’s claim of 
retaliation for raising complaints on behalf of students about sexual harassment by other 
students.  The court sharply rebuked the teacher for his belief that the school’s tolerance 
of sexual harassment among students violated Title VII, concluding that it is not 
reasonable to believe that the harassment of students could violate the Title VII rights of 
employees.241
The reasonable belief standard produced a similar result in Wimmer v. Suffolk 
County Police Department,242 a case involving a non-school setting where the court drew 
a sharp line between the rights of employees and the interests of other persons subjected 
to discrimination.  In this case, the plaintiff was a white male police officer who alleged 
retaliation for speaking out against the department’s treatment of minority citizens.243
discrimination in the employer’s policies supported a reasonable belief that sexual orientation 
discrimination violated Title VII); Howell v. North Central College, 331 F. Supp.2d 660, 663-64 (N.D. Ill. 
2004) (rejecting heterosexual plaintiff’s claim of retaliation for complaining about bias against 
heterosexuals on women’s basketball team because it was not reasonable to believe that Title IX covered 
sexual orientation discrimination).  For a contrasting view of the reasonableness of this perspective, see 
Martin v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 434, 448 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(refusing to apply the reasonable belief doctrine to reject plaintiff’s claim of retaliation for complaining of 
sexual orientation discrimination, and explaining that it is not reasonable to presume that a layperson would 
know the state of the law before complaining, but granting summary judgment for lack of causation).
239 Cf. WILDMAN, supra note 141, at 33-34 (discussing the interconnections between sexual orientation and 
gender oppression, and arguing that heterosexual privilege is inseparable from male privilege).
240
  2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5703 (Mar. 31, 2004).
241
  The teacher had complained that a self-styled group of male students calling themselves “the Posse” 
was harassing female students and creating a hostile environment.  The court dismissed the teacher’s 
understanding as unreasonable, stating simply that Title VII protects employees and not students.  Id.
242
  176 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1999).
243
  The plaintiff alleged that early on in his police training, as part of a self-introduction statement required 
for all trainees, he identified himself as an officer in “Humanity against Hatred,” a group founded by New 
York police officers and clergy to oppose discrimination, and expressed his opposition to collusion between 
police and prosecutors’ offices.  In addition, during field training, he reported overhearing officers using 
racial slurs and “was dissuaded from asking questions about” two instances when he witnessed an officer 
stopping minorities without cause.  Id. at 129.  He was fired at the conclusion of training, allegedly for 
speaking out against racism within the department.  The department, however, claimed that he was fired for 
deficiencies in performance.  As with many retaliation cases, the factual record is mixed and messy, and it 
is difficult to separate the performance problems from the hostility toward the plaintiff based on his 
opposition to racism.  For example, one of the supervising officers who rated the plaintiff most negatively 
was also alleged to have used racial slurs and to have known about the plaintiff’s membership in Humanity 
against Hatred.  Id. at 130-31 (discussing plaintiff’s interactions with Officer Ferrante); see also id. at 131 
(describing plaintiff’s allegation that one of the Lieutenants told him that the “stop hatred thing didn’t go 
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The Second Circuit dismissed the retaliation claim, finding that the plaintiff lacked a 
reasonable belief that the police department’s alleged race discrimination against 
minority citizens could violate an employee’s nondiscrimination rights under Title VII.244
Numerous cases similarly refuse to protect employees from retaliation under Title 
VII when they complain of discrimination against persons who are served by or are 
otherwise connected with their institutions, ruling that it is not reasonable to believe that 
Title VII forbids discrimination against nonemployees.245  Although this blunt statement 
of the law matches reductionist “hornbook” understandings of Title VII’s limits, some 
case law, read more creatively, supports a broader understanding.  It is not beyond reason 
to believe that an institution’s treatment of nonemployees can affect the work 
environment of employees.  By tolerating discrimination against students or clients, for 
example, institutions may exacerbate the work environments of employees in ways that 
touch on employees’ racial or gender identities.  The Supreme Court endorsed just such a 
rationale in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,246 when it approvingly cited the Fifth Circuit 
case of Rogers v. EEOC.247  In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit accepted the Hispanic plaintiff’s 
over well with one of my FTOs in particular . . . didn’t go over well with people at headquarters”); id. at 
132 (quoting the same Lieutenant as stating, at the meeting to discuss the plaintiff’s performance problems 
continued employment, “the words [the plaintiff] selects to express his thoughts tend to make others feel 
that he was liberal in his viewpoint”).  My critique here is limited to the court’s use of the reasonable belief
standard, but I note as an aside that proof of causation, as in disparate treatment cases, is complex and 
messy, especially where negative reactions to the plaintiff influence perceptions of job deficiencies.
244 Id. at 134-36.
245 See, e.g., Artis v. Francis Howell N. Band Boosters Ass’n, 161 F.3d 1178, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s claim that he was fired from the position of marching band instructor for complaining 
about the principal’s disparate treatment of black and white students because “opposing an employer’s 
actions outside the ambit of an employment practice is unprotected by Title VII”); Evans v. Kansas City, 
Mo. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 98, 100-101 (8th Cir. 1995) (overturning district court’s judgment for plaintiff, 
teacher, who alleged retaliation for opposing the principal’s plan to increase the non-minority student 
representation because plaintiff’s opposition did not involve any kind of employment practice); Lamb-
Bowman v. Delaware State Univ., 39 Fed. Appx. 748, 750-51, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13140, at *4-5 (3d 
Cir. June 28, 2002) (rejecting Title VII retaliation claim where plaintiff, athletic director, alleged retaliation 
for complaining of inequality of female athletes); Kunzler v. Canon, USA, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579-
82 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting the retaliation claim of a salesman who complained of a co-worker’s sexual 
harassment of a customer because the harassment of a customer is not an unlawful employment practice); 
Holt v. Lewis, 955 F. Supp. 1385, 1387-88 (N.D. Ala. 1995), aff’d, 109 F.3d 771 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(rejecting professor’s Title VII claim alleging retaliation for assisting a female student with her sex 
discrimination claim because it was not reasonable for the plaintiff to believe that Title VII covers 
discrimination against students); Crowley v. Prince George’s County, 890 F.2d 683, 687 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(rejecting retaliation claim by a white male former police officer because “investigating instances of racial 
harassment perpetrated by police officers against members of the community” did not involve an unlawful 
employment practice).  For decisions prior to Breeden extending protection employees who complain of 
discrimination against non-employees, see Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hospitals, Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1353-
56 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing retaliation claim by nurse who complained of racist treatment of patients); 
Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984-85 (9th Cir. 1994) (permitting Title VII retaliation claim by prison 
officer discharged for protesting discrimination against African American inmates).
246
  477 U.S. 57 (1986).
247
  454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
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claim that requiring African American patients to sit in a segregated waiting area 
contributed to a racially hostile work environment for the plaintiff, an employee.248
Courts applying the reasonable belief doctrine in this fashion, however, have cut 
short the implications of this precedent, refusing to acknowledge that discriminatory 
actions targeting the persons served by an organization may also adversely affect the 
work environment of the organization’s employees.  For example, without citing or 
addressing Rogers, the court in Wimmer rejected such a hostile environment theory in 
cursory fashion.249  In an interesting twist, however, the Court faulted the plaintiff, a 
white male, for failing to introduce evidence from minority employees that they regarded 
the treatment of African American citizens as creating a hostile environment for them.250
This observation hints at the possibility of applying a hostile environment theory to such 
a situation.  However, because such complexity would have undermined the court’s 
position that alternative interpretations are unreasonable, it abruptly resumed the façade 
of the hopelessness of the plaintiff’s position.251  However, the Court’s flippant dismissal 
of a hostile environment theory was unpersuasive.  As discussed previously, retaliation 
law should and does protect persons who oppose discrimination even if they are not the 
targets of the discrimination.  Under this precedent, it is not clear why the plaintiff should 
need to introduce evidence from minority officers that they perceived the environment to 
be hostile as long as he believed that such conduct created a hostile environment.  For the 
same reasons that retaliation law protects persons who oppose discrimination against 
others, including the difficulty targets face in claiming discrimination, it should not 
require the targets of discrimination to come forward and testify to perceived 
discrimination to save the retaliation claim.  
Instead of recognizing the interconnectedness and overlapping harms of 
discrimination, these courts stifle conversations about the intersection of equality 
interests among different constituencies within institutions.  In so doing, they miss 
important relational harms of discrimination, which often radiate beyond their immediate 
targets.  Courts applying the reasonable belief doctrine in this fashion treat discrimination 
as an individualistic problem without appreciating its social dimensions.  And in failing 
to protect the construction of anti-racist and anti-sexist identities of persons who are not 
among the class of persons immediately targeted, they impair the formation of broad-
based coalitions that cut across different constituency groups to promote gender and 
racial equality within institutions.
4. Imposing a Narrow and Court-Centered Definition of Reasonableness
The fourth and final critique offered here is implicit in each of the above 
criticisms and applies to all of the cases previously discussed.  The reasonable belief 
248 Cf. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law (draft, forthcoming 2005) 
(observing that most discussions of Rogers assume that both the plaintiff and the clients were African 
American, but noting that the plaintiff actually identified her race as “Hispanic”).
249 Wimmer, 176 F.3d at 136 (“It is inherent in the definition of a racially hostile work environment, 
however, that the person against whom the hostility is directed must be in an employment relationship with 
the employer.”). 
250 Id. at 136 (“Because [plaintiff] did not introduce evidence that minority employees of the Department 
felt that they worked in a racially hostile environment, [plaintiff] could not have reasonably believed that he 
was protesting an unlawful hostile work environment.”). 
251 Id. at 136 n.6 (“Even if [plaintiff] had presented such evidence, it is not clear that he would have 
standing to bring a Title VII hostile work environment claim.”).  
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standard imposes a court-centric understanding that evaluates reasonableness from the 
privileged perspective of judges.  In this respect, the reasonableness requirement here 
differs significantly from reasonableness inquiries in other areas of discrimination law, 
such as judging the reasonableness of perceiving a hostile environment.252  The issue of 
perspective is important in any such judicial foray into reasonableness.  Unlike 
harassment law, however, the reasonable belief doctrine in retaliation claims permits no 
room for variation in the subjective circumstances of the plaintiff to influence the 
determination of reasonableness.253  Instead, the perspective is self-consciously narrowed 
to that of a person with “the” perfect understanding of law and legal reasoning—that is, 
the judge who applies the reasonable belief standard in that particular case.
All of the cases discussed above, including Breeden, illustrate how judicial 
interpretation and the perspectives of judges set the outer boundaries of reasonableness.  
Some courts are more forthright about this perspective than others.  The following two 
cases provide examples of court decisions explicitly rejecting the argument that 
reasonableness should be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable employee or 
layperson, and instead limiting reasonableness to the constraints imposed by the courts’ 
reading of existing precedent.  In each case, the relevant existing precedent was more 
ambiguous than the court acknowledged.  These courts imposed their selective reading of 
the law as the limit on reasonableness, adopting a singularly narrow and privileged 
perspective from which to evaluate the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief.
In one such case, Talanda v. KFC Management Company,254 the plaintiff, a store 
manager, had resisted orders to remove a woman who had “serious dental problems” 
from a customer service position because her appearance would not be sufficiently 
pleasing to customers.  When the manager continued to resist because he believed it was 
legally and morally wrong to discriminate against someone for “facial disfigurement,” the 
employer fired him.  He claimed that the firing was a retaliatory discharge for opposing 
what he perceived as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, explaining that 
he believed that the woman was disabled and that the company regarded her as 
disabled.255  The Seventh Circuit dismissed this account as unreasonable, explaining that
to qualify as an impairment under the ADA, the woman’s disfigurement would have to 
substantially limit one or more major life activities.256  The missing teeth did not rise to 
252
  See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (setting the threshold for actionable sexual 
harassment as one that is “severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work 
environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive”).
253
  See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (stating that “the objective 
severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position, considering ‘all the circumstances’”).
254
  140 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1998).
255
  Courts generally apply the same legal standards to retaliation claims under the ADA as they do under 
Title VII. See id. at 1095-96.
256 Id. at 1096-97 & n.8 (citing ADA case law and regulations to show that the facial disfigurement did not 
substantially limit one or major life activities).  Like many retaliation cases, this case is more factually 
complicated than this brief summary can convey.  The employer alleged that the plaintiff acted 
inappropriately in a number of respects, including secretly tape-recording a conversation with his 
supervisor in which he was ordered to fire the woman, pressuring the woman to take legal action herself so 
that “they could make money,” and failing to explain to the employer that he believed that the directive to 
fire her violated that ADA.  Id. at 1093-95.  If true, these facts might justify rejecting the plaintiff’s 
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this level, the court explained, despite the fact that her disfigurement kept her from doing 
otherwise appropriate work for this employer.257  The court measured the reasonableness 
of the plaintiff’s belief against its own selective reading of existing case law.258  By 
labeling competing legal understandings unreasonable, the court disguised interpretive 
choices about the meaning and scope of discrimination law, while the neutral language of 
reasonableness obscured the privileged perspective that defined and imposed this 
dominant understanding.259
A second example of a court imposing its selective interpretation of legal 
precedent as the exclusive standard of reasonableness comes from the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corporation.260  In Harper, the 
plaintiffs, male employees at Blockbuster, opposed the company’s institution of a 
grooming policy requiring only male employees to maintain short haircuts.  The court 
ruled that the plaintiffs did not engage in protected activity, despite their belief that the 
policy amounted to sex discrimination, because every circuit court that has considered 
disparate hairstyle policies has upheld them under Title VII.261  The court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ request that it judge the reasonableness of their beliefs as laypersons rather 
retaliation claim on other grounds.  I limit my critique to the court’s application of the reasonable belief 
standard, which strictly construes existing legal precedent to set the outer limits of reasonable belief.
257 Id. at 1097 (citing EEOC regulations stating that the “inability to perform a single, particular job does 
not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working”).
258
  The court’s reasoning is subject to questioning even within the framework of the legal precedents that it 
cited.  The court chided the plaintiff for relying on Johnson v. American Chamber of Commerce Publishers, 
108 F.3d 818, 819-20 (7th Cir. 1997), in which the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s 
determination that the plaintiff’s missing teeth did not rise to the level of a “cosmetic disfigurement.”  
Talanda, 140 F.3d at 1098 n.13.  The court rebuked the plaintiff’s “significant reliance on Johnson,” 
insisting that “[a] precise reading of Johnson . . . offers no support for Mr. Talanda’s contention,” since the 
reversal of the district court in Johnson “was based on the district court’s misapprehension that a person 
could not be regarded as having a disability unless that person actually had the disability.”  Id. at 1098 n.13.  
As the Talenda court further explained, “[w]e therefore made clear that a person need not actually have the 
impairment to be perceived as having it.”  In other words, Mr. Talanda’s reliance on Johnson was 
inapposite because he could not prove that his employer perceived the woman as having an impairment that 
limits a major life activity, unlike the employer’s perception of the disability in Johnson.  However, given 
that the employer ordered Mr. Talenda to remove the woman from her position because of what it viewed 
as a facial disfigurement, the unreasonableness of Mr. Talenda’s reading of his employer’s perception is far 
from obvious.  The court’s convoluted effort to limit its decision in Johnson would make for a lively 
dissection and discussion in a law school class—far from a sufficiently air tight rationale to deem 
alternative readings unreasonable.
259
  At the same time, however, the court’s qualification that it did not “mean to imply that facial 
disfigurement, including facial disfigurement caused by dental problems, can never be a disability for 
purposes of the ADA,” revealed the slipperiness of the legal issue.  The court cited several examples from 
the EEOC that reveal the complexity and contradictions of the court’s legal reasoning.  Id. at 1098 n.13 
(citing EEOC Appendix to the regulations, stating, “that disparate treatment occurs when an employer 
excludes an employee with a severe facial disfigurement from staff meetings because the employer does 
not like to look at the employee . . . ,” and “noting that a prominent facial scar or involuntary head jerk may 
be perceived as an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity when an employer discriminates 
against the person because of the complaints of customers”) (citations omitted).  As these examples 
demonstrate, the EEOC regulations and examples left much more room than the court acknowledged for 
reasoned argument as to whether the woman’s facial disfigurement was a disability under the ADA.
260
  139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998).
261 Id. at 1388 (“The reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ belief in this case is belied by the unanimity with 
which the courts have declared grooming policies like Blockbuster’s non-discriminatory.”).
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than based on the substantive law.262  By invoking dominant interpretations of existing 
case law to set the outer boundaries of reasonableness, and marginalizing alternative and 
broader understandings, the court obscured the wide space for interpretive debate within 
legal interpretation.263  Used in such a fashion, the reasonable belief doctrine turns the 
retaliation claim into a device for legitimating inequality and maintaining privilege, rather 
than an instrument for challenging it.264
C. A Call for Reforming Reasonable Belief
The reasonable belief doctrine, as applied by the courts, is neither a necessary nor 
an inevitable limitation on retaliation claims under discrimination law.  Having 
recognized that protection of oppositional activities is not limited to complaints about 
practices that are actually illegal, there is nothing in the language of Title VII’s 
opposition clause that requires courts to use a reasonable belief standard as the boundary 
for such claims, and certainly not one bounded to dominant judicial interpretations of 
current legal precedent.265  There is even less reason to import a reasonable belief 
standard into discrimination statutes, such as Title VI and Title IX, which lack any 
linguistic distinction between participation and opposition.  The importation of the 
262 Id. at 1388 n.2 (“[i]f the plaintiffs are free to disclaim knowledge of the substantive law, the 
reasonableness inquiry becomes no more than speculation regarding their substantive knowledge.”).
263
  Once again, however, the court’s subsequent acknowledgement of some dissension on the issue reveals 
cracks in the orthodoxy.  See id. (“The EEOC initially took a contrary position, but in the face of the 
unanimous position of the courts of appeal that have addressed the issue, it finally ‘concluded that 
successful litigation of male hair length cases would be virtually impossible.’  . . . Accordingly, the EEOC 
ran up a white flag on the issue, advising its field offices to administratively close all sex discrimination 
charges dealing with male hair length.”)  The court proceeded to make weakly reasoned arguments 
distinguishing the precedent on which plaintiffs relied, recasting UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 
(1991), for example, cited by plaintiffs for the principle that facially sex-based classifications violate Title 
VII, as a case colored by the fundamental right to bear children.  Id. at 1388.  As revealed by the court’s 
acknowledgement of early uncertainty and its weak reasoning distinguishing contrary case law, the limits 
imposed by legal precedent on the “reasonableness” of the plaintiffs’ belief have nothing to do with reason 
and everything to do with power.
264
  For another example of an Eleventh Circuit decision that merges the court’s selective reading of 
precedent with the outer boundaries of reasonableness, see Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 
1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim of retaliation for refusing to sign an agreement to arbitrate 
discrimination claims, notwithstanding plaintiff’s reliance on EEOC and Ninth Circuit authority 
invalidating such clauses, and emphasizing the “near universal approval” of arbitration agreements in 
“[a]lmost every other circuit”).  The court viewed the Ninth Circuit decision on which the plaintiff relied as 
wrongly decided, and the plaintiff’s reliance on it and the EEOC guidance as unreasonable.  Id. at 1315-17; 
but see EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2000) (remanding as an open 
question the issue of whether adverse action against an employee who refuses to sign an agreement to 
arbitrate discrimination claims gives rise to a retaliation claim).  Once again, the “reasonableness” of the 
plaintiff’s belief was determined by judicial power and the court’s preferred reading of precedent.
265
  The standard explanation for the tighter requirement applied to Title VII retaliation claims under the 
opposition clause is that Congress did not write the opposition clause to encompass as broad a level of 
protection as afforded under the participation clause.  See, e.g., Parker v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 
652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining this rationale).  However, the use of the reasonable belief 
doctrine does not follow from any linguistic differences between the two clauses, but rather from a desire to 
protect employer prerogatives to retaliate against persons who raise complaints in the workplace that have 
nothing to do with discrimination.  This interest can be accommodated with a subjective good faith 
standard, coupled with the standard advocated here, that the plaintiff make a reasoned argument about how 
the practices opposed conflict with the goals and objectives of discrimination law.
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reasonable belief standard into these statutes threatens to erase the gains made from 
recognizing protection from retaliation under these statutes.
The boundaries of the retaliation claim should be defined with due regard for the 
social reality that retaliation functions to silence discrimination claims and preserve 
social inequality, and for the theory of why retaliation is encompassed by prohibitions on 
discrimination.  These reasons counsel for a broader approach to the varied 
understandings of bias and discrimination that form the basis for protected activity.  
Although it is true that retaliation for opposing a practice that has “nothing to do with” 
discrimination is not encompassed by the retaliation claim,266 a better standard would ask 
whether the plaintiff can make a reasoned case that the practices opposed interfere with 
the goals and objectives of discrimination law.  Such a standard should leave room for 
recognizing interpretive ambiguity and different views as to the direction discrimination 
law should take.  The perspective from which reasonableness is measured should not be 
that of the judge reading and selecting the dominant legal precedents, but the reasonable 
employee, student, or person in the organization who wishes to further the goals of 
discrimination law: dismantling unjust privilege and promoting the conditions necessary 
for equal citizenship.
V.  CONCLUSION
Much is at stake in the retaliation claim.  The fear of retaliation and an awareness 
of the profound social costs of claiming discrimination are the primary reasons why 
people stay silent in the face of perceived inequality.  For discrimination law to provide 
meaningful protection, legal standards must protect persons who perceive discrimination 
and give voice to their concerns.  This is a worthy goal for discrimination law to pursue, 
as giving voice to discrimination produces a myriad of benefits, both personal and 
societal.267  Vocalizing opposition to inequality opens the door to important social and 
institutional change and enables challengers to begin a valuable dialogue within their 
communities.268  By fully protecting persons who confront discrimination, the law can 
provide greater space for contesting and possibly reshaping the social norms that 
facilitate discrimination in the first place.  
The Court’s decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education is an 
important starting point toward further theorizing about the connections between 
discrimination and retaliation.  The recognition of retaliation as a species of 
discrimination holds great promise for refocusing discrimination law on preserving 
privilege and reinvigorating its animating value of promoting equal citizenship.  Situating 
the retaliation claim as part of a ban on intentional discrimination breaks down the 
266
   Cf. Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 319 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Terminating an employee because she 
opposes practices which have nothing to do with Title VI is not Title VI retaliation.”).
267
   For a discussion of the personal benefits of reporting discrimination, see Dodd et al., supra note 10, at 
568 (citing research showing the “many benefits of confronting sexist remarks,” including benefits to self-
image, job performance, and physical and emotional health).  For a discussion of the societal benefits of 
challenging discrimination and the potential for reshaping social norms, see Swim &. Hyers, supra note 23.
268
    For an eloquent discourse on the value of complaining, see Crosby, supra note 10, at 169-84 
(advocating the desirability of complaining as necessary for change and developing a better world, despite 
the chilling social norms that punish complainers, and urging persons to “rail against false silences”).
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status/conduct divide in the Court’s nondiscrimination jurisprudence and promotes and 
strengthens the democracy-enhancing ambitions of discrimination law.  
However, we should not be too sanguine about the prospects of legal doctrine to 
secure meaningful social change.  The promise of the retaliation claim is undercut by 
unnecessarily restrictive doctrine that ultimately reinforces selective and narrow 
understandings of discrimination that do more to legitimate than to disrupt inequality.  It 
would be unfortunate if the retaliation claim languished under the burden of this overly 
restrictive doctrine, particularly in light of its unique potential for disrupting inequality 
within institutions.  This Article’s examination of the retaliation claim illustrates how 
legal doctrine can simulatensously function to challenge and legitimate inequality.  It also 
suggests a need for further attention to the varied ways in which law punishes and renders 
vulnerable those persons who challenge inequality, particularly when the challenge 
exceeds the boundaries of dominant discourses about discrimination.
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